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ITS OWN DUBIOUS BATTLE: THE IMPOSSIBLE 
DEFENSE OF AN EFFECTIVE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
AHMED WHITE* 
 One of the most important statutes ever enacted, the National Labor 
Relations Act envisaged the right to strike as the centerpiece of a system of 
labor law whose central aims included dramatically diminishing the 
pervasive exploitation and steep inequality that are endemic to modern 
capitalism. These goals have never been more relevant. But they have 
proved difficult to realize via the labor law, in large part because an 
effective right to strike has long been elusive, undermined by courts, 
Congress, the NLRB, and powerful elements of the business community. 
Recognizing this, labor scholars have made the restoration of the right to 
strike a cornerstone of labor law scholarship. Authorities in the field have 
developed an impressive literature that stresses the importance of strikes 
and strongly criticizes the arguments that judges, legislators, and others 
have used to justify their degradation of the right to strike. But this 
literature has developed without its authors ever answering a fundamental 
question, which is whether an effective right to strike is a viable aspiration 
in the first place. This Article takes up this question. It documents the 
crucial role that strikes have played in building the labor movement, 
legitimating the labor law itself, and indeed validating the New Deal and, 
with this, the modern administrative state; and it confirms the integral role 
that strikes play in contesting the corrosive power capitalism accords 
employers over the workplace and the spoils of production. But this Article 
also shows how the strikes that were effective in these crucial ways were 
not conventional strikes, limited to the simple withholding of labor and the 
advertisement of workers’ grievances. Instead, they inevitably embraced 
disorderly, coercive tactics like mass picketing and sit-down strikes to a 
degree that suggests that tactics such as these are indeed essential if strikes 
are to be effective. Yet strikes that have featured these tactics have never 
enjoyed any legitimacy beyond the ranks of labor, radical activists, and 
academic sympathizers. Their inherent affronts to property and public order 
place them well beyond the purview of what could ever constitute a viable 
legal right in liberal society; and they have been treated accordingly by 
courts, Congress, and other elite authorities. From this vantage, it becomes 
clear that an effective right to strike is not only an impossible distraction but 
a dangerous fantasy that prevents labor’s champions from confronting the 
broader, sobering truths that this country’s legal and political system are, at 
root, anathema to a truly viable system of labor rights and that labor’s 
salvation must be sought elsewhere. 
 
*  Nicholas Rosenbaum Professor of Law, University of Colorado-Boulder. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to the faculty of the University at Buffalo 
School of Law and to his own colleagues at the University of Colorado for the many 
incisive and helpful comments they provided at presentations of earlier drafts of this 
Article. He also benefitted greatly from the comments of his fellow panelists and other 
participants in a forum on the right to strike at the 2018 Law and Society meeting in 
Toronto. 
1066 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
Introduction .................................................................. 1066 
I.  The History of the Right to Strike ............................... 1073 
A.  The Right to Strike in the “Open Shop” Era .............. 1074 
B.  The Right to Strike in the New Deal Era .................. 1081 
C.  The Right to Strike in Times of Détente and Decline ... 1089 
II.  The Triumph of Effective Strikes and the Stillbirth of an 
Effective Right to Strike ........................................... 1095 
A.  Effective Strikes and the Law—from the Wagner Act to 
Taft-Hartley .................................................... 1096 
B.  The Law and the Outlawing of Strike Militancy ......... 1111 
III.  Property, Order, and the Limits of the Right to Strike in 
Liberal Society ...................................................... 1115 
Conclusion ................................................................... 1127 
INTRODUCTION 
“They say ‘you got a right to strike but you can’t picket,’ an’ they 
know a strike won’t work without picket-in’.”1 This is the angry lament 
of Mac McLeod, a central character in John Steinbeck’s 1936 novel, In 
Dubious Battle, delivered just after Mac and fellow unionists were 
enjoined by a carload of heavily-armed police “to keep order.”2 “You 
can march as long as you don’t block traffic,” said the head cop, “but 
you are not going to interfere with anybody. Get that?”3 
Recently adapted to film in a movie that is notably long on stars 
but short on distribution,4 the novel is considered one of Steinbeck’s 
finest.5 It is also perhaps the most powerful depiction of a labor strike 
in American literature. A bitter reflection on the intense interpersonal 
conflicts, moral dilemmas, and political impasses that are central to 
labor struggles, and based on the author’s acquaintances with workers 
and organizers in the region, the book tells the tragic story of a fruit-
pickers strike led by radicals in Depression-era California.6 In Dubious 
Battle broaches a set of crucial issues, which are seldom discussed 
 
 1.  JOHN STEINBECK, IN DUBIOUS BATTLE 165 (Penguin 1992) (1936). 
 2.  Id. at 164–65. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  IN DUBIOUS BATTLE (AMBI Pictures 2017). Among the cast: James 
Franco, Robert Duvall, Ed Harris, and Selena Gomez. In Dubious Battle, IMDB, 
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt4411618/ [https://perma.cc/Y3S6-X2WA]. 
 5.  See Alfred Kazin, The Unhappy Man from Happy Valley, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 4, 1958, at BR1; Fred T. March, In Dubious Battle and Other Recent Works of 
Fiction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1936, at BR7. 
 6.  Jackson J. Benson & Anne Loftis, John Steinbeck and Farm Labor 
Unionization: The Background of In Dubious Battle, 52 AM. LIT. 194 (1980). 
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anymore, concerning the nature of strikes and the acceptable limits of 
class struggle and workers’ protests in liberal society.7 
For much of this country’s post-Civil War history, “hitting the 
bricks” was a way for workers to try to push back against capitalist 
employers. Sometimes the strikers succeeded, gaining union 
recognition and better working conditions. But often enough, their 
impertinence was repaid with arrests, beatings, and blacklisting; and 
the strikes ended in failure, sometimes with blood pooled on the streets 
and soaked into the dirt, as in Steinbeck’s story. Hundreds, possibly 
thousands lost their lives8—one can only roughly estimate the numbers, 
so commonplace and prosaic were these practices in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, excluding the years 1906 
through 1913, for which there are no records, between 1881 and 1935, 
the year Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (or Wagner 
Act, in its early form), there were in the neighborhood of 80,000 
strikes in America, involving about 30 million workers.9 Despite all the 
dangers and the likelihood that their efforts would prove futile, workers 
in these millions downed the tools and picketed, convinced that doing 
so was not only necessary to their immediate interests but a mandate of 
their position in class society. 
The Wagner Act purported, for the first time in American history, 
to extend a definite, readily enforceable right to strike to most 
American workers. Not coincidentally, the years surrounding its 
enactment featured the most intense wave of labor conflict in the 
country’s history. When the statute became effective in 1937 (having 
been widely ignored by employers and blocked by hostile courts), the 
violence of strikes began to diminish, though not so much their 
frequency. For much of the period after the Second World War, strikes 
remained common even as they also became less ambitious in their 
aims and less militant in their conduct. Beginning about forty years 
ago, things changed again. Strikes suddenly became rare as well, to the 
point that workers today basically do not strike at all. From 1947 
through 1976, the government documented an average of just over 300 
“major work stoppages” (strikes and lockouts involving at least 1000 
workers) every year; over the last decade, the annual average was only 
 
 7.  On the way Steinbeck’s dislike of Communists and, apparently, Mexican-
American workers shaped his narratives, see KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, RIGHT OUT OF 
CALIFORNIA: THE 1930S AND THE BIG BUSINESS ROOTS OF MODERN CONSERVATISM 
(2015). 
 8.  See Paul F. Lipold, “Striking Deaths” at Their Roots: Assaying the Social 
Determinants of Extreme Labor-Management Violence in US Labor History—1877–
1947, 38 SOC. SCI. HIST. 541, 542 (2014). 
 9.  Florence Peterson, Review of Strikes in the United States, 46 MONTHLY 
LAB. REV. 1047, 1066 (1938). The total of number of workers involved also excludes 
the years 1914 and 1915. Id. 
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14.10 Even the much-ballyhooed mini-strike wave of 2018 appears to be 
largely an illusion built on a combination of wishful thinking and a 
convenient misconstruction of a string of well-reported, and sometimes 
impressive, strikes, as a trend.11 In any event, militancy of the sort that 
was commonplace when Steinbeck wrote his book, along with the open 
strife and bloodshed that made the novel a work of undeniable realism, 
are nearly unheard of today. 
The waning of bloody battles may be a good thing. But there is not 
much to celebrate about the overall demise of strikes—not if you are a 
worker or care about the working class. For strikes are the most 
important mode of working class protest, the best way, it seems, for 
workers to directly challenge capitalist hegemony by their own hand, to 
alter the terms of exploitation if not to build a new world. As they have 
declined, so has the strength of the labor movement and, with this, the 
ability of workers to contest the power that employers wield over their 
work lives and economic fortunes. And so it is that with the demise of 
strikes, union representation has plummeted, wages have stagnated, 
economic inequality skyrocketed, and the everyday caprices and 
tyrannies of capitalist management have been entwined in the web of 
demeaning indignities, patronizing indulgences, and suffocating 
bureaucratic rules that define the contemporary workplace. 
Nevertheless, in most quarters the decline in strikes has been taken 
in stride, if noticed at all. For most people, strikes are hardly more than 
historical relics or quaint curiosities that seldom affect their daily lives 
or command much of their attention. Ironically, this is probably one 
reason the very modest labor conflict of the last year has been so over-
characterized. Once a preoccupation of newspaper editorialists, 
lawyers, and other commentators, a concern of government, and the 
subject of numerous hearings and reports, abundant litigation, and 
seemingly endless attempts at legislation, strikes are now rarely of any 
interest in any of these quarters. Where judges, politicians, and 
editorialists once worried greatly over how to deal with strikes of the 
kind that Steinbeck fictionalized, how to protect the economy (not to 
mention the interests of individual capitalists) from the disruptive 
effects of labor unrest, and sometimes how to preserve the ability of 
workers to strike in meaningful ways, their successors stand mute in the 
context of the near extinction of this form of protest. It has been two 
 
 10.  Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major Work Stoppages in 2016 
(Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/wkstp_02092017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R9W5-FP8G]. 
 11.  On the actual frequency of both strikes and of idle days because of them 
over this period, see Doug Henwood, Sadly, There Is No Strike Wave, MONTHLY REV. 
ONLINE (Sept. 12, 2018), https://mronline.org/2018/09/12/sadly-there-is-no-strike-
wave/ [https://perma.cc/F7FS-P47J]. 
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decades since Congress, which once grappled with these issues on a 
regular basis, has seriously confronted the question of strikes.12 Its last 
engagement with the right to strike attempts, in the early 1990s, to 
enact modest changes in the law relative to employers’ use of 
replacement workers during strikes. And even this effort, which 
collapsed in the mid 1990s, hardly seemed possessed of the kind of 
urgency that characterized earlier forays on these issues.13 
Among the few Americans who well remember what strikes are 
and why they are important are labor scholars. For them, at least, 
strikes remain a preoccupation. Prominent students of labor like James 
Atleson, Julius Getman, Karl Klare, and James Pope—to name the most 
notable of this group—have expended much effort over the past few 
decades identifying and critiquing legal doctrines which have 
undermined the right to strike. Important to them in this regard are 
doctrines that give employers the prerogative to easily replace striking 
workers; that allow employers to enjoin and even fire strikers on the 
ground that they have engaged in coercive “misconduct,” or because 
they have protested the wrong issue or in the wrong way; that prohibit 
sympathy strikes and general strikes, and spontaneous “wildcat” 
strikes; and that funnel labor disputes off of picket lines and into legal 
proceedings and arbitrations.14 
 
 12. The diminishing interest in the right to strike is evident in the results a 
search of Proquest’s Congressional and Executive Publications database, which shows 
that in the 50 years between 1948 and 1999, the term “right to strike” appeared in 
nearly 5000 documents, including over 500 bills and nearly 1500 entries in the 
Congressional Record (Bound Edition); and that in the twenty years since then, the 
phrase has appeared only 703 times, in 41 bills and 31 times in the Congressional 
Record (Bound Edition). 
 13.  See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5, The Striker Replacement Bill: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations of the H. Comm on Educ. & Labor, 
102d Cong. (1991); Collective Bargaining and the Hiring of Permanent Strike 
Replacements: Hearing Before the Emp’t & Hous. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t 
Operations, 102d Cong. (1992); Preventing Replacement of Economic Strikers: Hearing 
on S. 2112 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 
101st Cong. (1990); 137 CONG. REC. 2073 (1991) (statement of Rep. Owens); 137 
CONG. REC. 5455 (1991). 
 14.  See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN 
AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983); JULIUS G. GETMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON UNIONS 
52–68 (2016); James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and 
Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518 (2004); Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of 
the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. 
L. REV. 265 (1978); see also Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, The Continuing 
Assault on the Right to Strike, 79 TEX. L. REV. 703, 718 (2001). I have also contributed 
to this literature. See, e.g., Ahmed A. White, The Depression Era Sit-Down Strikes and 
the Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 26–60 (2010); Ahmed A. 
White, Mutiny, Shipboard Strikes, and the Supreme Court’s Subversion of New Deal 
Labor Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 275 (2004). Interest in this topic has 
continued in recent times as well. There was, for instance, a, wide-ranging colloquy in 
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These doctrines have eviscerated a once-vital right to strike, these 
scholars tell us, subverting a prerogative that earlier in the century was 
central to improving conditions for workers and lending legitimacy to 
the very idea that workers have rights to claim in the first place. 
Indeed, in the 1930s and 1940s, especially, a massive and sustained 
campaign of strikes proved crucial to the formation of the modern labor 
movement, the political and legal validation of the Wagner Act, and 
ultimately the survival of the New Deal itself. This was true even as the 
Wagner Act itself seemed to play a crucial role in conveying to 
workers, for the first time, an effective right to strike. But the problem 
as far as the right to strike goes, we are told, is that the statute was 
later weakened and corrupted by the connivances of judges and 
Congress, urged on by a business community relentless in its contempt 
for organized labor, and abetted at times by inept or corrupt union 
leaders and a weak and politically diffident National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB, the entity with primary authority for enforcing the labor 
law). And so the Wagner Act is said to have had a great potential, only 
to have been tragically “deradicalized,” as Klare puts it; and workers 
are said to have “lost” the right to strike, in Pope’s words, with 
devastating consequences for workers today and ominous portents for 
generations ahead.15 Critically, these authors argue, an effective right to 
strike must be restored at the expense of these unjustified impositions.16 
Only then will the labor law regain its relevance and the labor 
movement its ability to improve the lives of workers. 
Early on, this attempt to defend an effective right to strike was the 
object of mean-spirited criticism by more conventional scholars who, in 
the guise of unmasking its interpretative shortcomings, rejected its 
radicalism and recoiled at its underlying supposition that law is not only 
malleable and untethered to its formal, elite iterations, but within the 
province of workers to reshape around their own interests and visions.17 
Despite these efforts, which focused on the work of Klare and 
Katherine Stone, whose critique of post-war “industrial pluralism” 
 
the Boston Review on this question last year. See James Gray Pope, Ed Bruno & Peter 
Kellman, The Right to Strike, BOS. REV. (May 22, 2017), 
http://bostonreview.net/forum/james-gray-pope-ed-bruno-peter-kellman-right-strike 
[https://perma.cc/2TTF-FCG4]; see also Garret Keizer, Labor’s Last Stand, HARPER’S, 
Sept. 2018, at 24. And the issue was also the subject of an important panel at the 
Annual Meeting on Law and Society 2018 in Toronto. See 2018 Annual Meeting 
Schedule, L. & SOC. ASS’N, 
http://www.lawandsociety.org/Toronto2018/docs/2018_Guts_May_1_,_2018_FINAL_
Single_page.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GQP-43XP]. 
 15.  Klare, supra note 14, at 265–68; Pope, supra note 14, 527–34. 
 16.  See infra Part III. 
 17.  Matthew W. Finkin, Revisionism in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REV. 23 
(1984); Louis B. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS Land, 36 
STAN. L. REV. 413 (1984). 
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shared a similar reasoning—or maybe, to some extent, anyway, because 
of them—support for this campaign to restore the right to strike seems 
like a mandate among scholars and commentators who purport to take 
seriously the interests of workers.18 And yet for all its appeal, this 
project nevertheless suffers from a remarkably negligent oversight, one 
that has nothing to do with morality of its pretense that the law is 
malleable and that workers can remake it—a proposition that is broadly 
true and eminently defensible. Instead, it has to do with its practical 
feasibility. In fact, as this Article argues, a critical reflection on this 
question suggests that the effort to realize an effective right to strike is 
actually quite impossible and that attempts to do so, however earnest 
and thoughtful they may be, represent as dubious a battle as the 
hopeless walkout dramatized in Steinbeck’s book. 
This doleful conclusion rests on a frank understanding of the legal 
and political realities in which strikes necessarily play out. There are 
many kinds of strikes, but those that are apt to be successful in 
challenging employers’ power and interests entail a level of militancy 
that sets them against well-entrenched notion of property and public 
order. This was true in the 1930s and 1940s when these values 
contradicted, at once, strike militancy and whatever radical potential 
the Wagner Act may have had. Ironically, it is perhaps even truer 
today, now that workers do in fact enjoy the right to strike, albeit only 
in more conventional ways. Seen in this light, those doctrines that have 
undermined the right to strike are not aberrations or jurisprudential 
failings—not mistakes in any sense, in fact, nor a retreat from some 
earlier, truer iteration of the labor law. Rather, they represent a settling 
of the labor law on bedrock precepts of the American life. However 
illegitimate those precepts may be from a vantage that questions 
capitalism’s essential legitimacy and takes the rights of workers 
seriously, they reign supreme, foreclosing an effective right to strike. 
All of this, as I argue in this Article, is made plainly evident by a 
critical review of the history of strikes and striking. To anticipate a bit 
more of the argument that follows, the strikes most crucial to the 
building of the labor movement in the 1930s and 1940s were not built 
only around peaceful picketing and a withholding of labor. Rather, they 
were sit-down strikes and strikes built on mass picketing, as well as, to 
some extent, secondary boycotts. And strikes of this kind were never 
considered lawful or politically appropriate. Ironically, it was these 
strikes that legitimated the Wagner Act itself and the New Deal. But 
they could not legitimate themselves. 
Those who call for resurrecting the right to strike contend that the 
flourishing of strike militancy reflected, if not the inherent politics of 
 
 18.  Finkin, supra note 17, at 23, 54–55. 
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the original Wagner Act before it was “de-radicalized,” then at least its 
potential. To be sure, it is clear that the Wagner Act was a remarkable 
document which did more to advance workers’ rights than any statute in 
American history; and it was at least ambiguous on the question of the 
legal status of strike militancy. But what seemed like its support for 
worker militancy was not a product of any particular potential. Rather, 
it was a reflection of the difficulty that judges, legislators, and other 
authorities, who dedicated themselves to restraining these strikes even 
as they flourished, encountered in prosecuting these values amid the 
unique economic and political conditions of the 1930s and 1940s. These 
obstructive conditions were quite temporary, though, and the 
authorities’ efforts culminated soon enough in the near-categorical 
prohibition of the tactics that had made strikes so effective. It is in this 
way that the history of strikes shows less in the way of de-radicalization 
than an encounter with the unyielding outer boundaries of what labor 
protest and labor rights can be in liberal society. 
As this all played out, it left in its wake a right to strike, but one 
whose power consists almost entirely of the ability of workers to 
pressure employers by withholding labor, while also maybe publicizing 
the workers’ issues and bolstering their morale. But while publicity and 
morale are not irrelevant, in the end they are not effective weapons in 
their own right. Nor are they generally advanced when strikes are 
broken. Moreover, the withholding of labor, unless it could be 
managed on a very large scale—something the law also tends to 
prohibit by its restrictions on secondary boycotts, by barring sympathy 
strikes and general strikes—is inherently ineffective in all but a small 
number of cases where workers remain irreplaceable. Of course, 
striking in such a conventional way accords with liberal notions of 
property and social order; but precisely because of this it is simply not 
coercive enough to be effective. And it is bound to remain ineffective, 
particularly in a context where workers far outnumber decent jobs, 
where mechanization and automation have steadily eaten away at the 
centrality of skill, where the perils that employers face in the course of 
labor disputes are as impersonal as the risks to workers are not, where 
employers wield overwhelming advantages in wealth and power over 
workers, where the state’s machinery for enforcing property rights and 
social order have never been more potent—where, in fact, capital is 
capital and workers are workers. 
From this perspective, the quest for an effective right to strike 
emerges as a fantasy—an appealing fantasy for many, but a fantasy no 
less, steeped in a misplaced and exaggerated faith in the law and a 
misreading of the class politics of modern liberalism. The campaign to 
resurrect such a right appears, too, not only as a dead-end and a 
distraction, but an undertaking that risks blinding those who support 
viable unionism and the interests of the working class to the more 
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important and fundamental fact that liberalism and the legal system are, 
in the end, antithetical to a meaningful system of labor rights. It is for 
this reason that the call for an effective right to strike should be set 
aside in favor of more direct endorsement of militancy and a turn away 
from the law and instead towards a political program that might 
advance the interests of the working class regardless of what the law 
might hold. 
The argument that follows further elaborates these main 
contentions about the history of striking and the nature of strikes in 
liberal society, augmented by a discussion of the legal terrain on which 
all of this has played out. It unfolds in three main parts. Part I describes 
how the concept of a right to strike developed in concert with the 
history of striking itself, how both were influenced by the evolving 
condition of labor, and how this history created the circumstances 
under which it became possible to conceive of an effective right to 
strike without making this possible in fact. Part II consists of a critical 
review of the fate of coercive and disorderly strikes, especially those 
featuring sit-down tactics and mass picketing. It considers how the 
courts, the NLRB, and Congress confronted these strikes, and how they 
moved with increasing vigor to proscribe them as soon as these strikes 
emerged as effective forms of labor protest. Part III looks more 
carefully at the underpinnings of this repudiation of strike militancy, 
finding in court rulings and other pronouncements against the strikes an 
opposition to coercion and disorder that, even if sometimes invoked 
disingenuously, is nonetheless firmly anchored in modern liberalism 
and its conception of the appropriate boundaries of class protest and 
labor conflict. On this rests the argument that an effective right to strike 
is impossible and the pursuit of it, problematic. The final part is a brief 
conclusion that sums up some of the implications of this argument. 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
To understand anything about the right to strike it is crucial to 
appreciate the hostility running through much of American history to 
workers’ ability to strike at all—a stance that stood at the center of a 
comprehensive program of labor repression in the latter parts of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries so complete that it made the 
formation of functional unions nearly impossible. Time and again, 
police, militiamen, and company agents, sometimes armed with the 
law, sometimes without any legal pretext at all, denied workers the 
right to strike. Often this took the form of limiting workers’ ability to 
picket or to persuade others to join them; sometimes it involved 
1074 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
denying workers the right simply to quit work in a concerted fashion.19 
Effectuating what labor historian Selig Perlman famously called an 
“effective will to power” that, he said, is the capitalists’ fundamental 
prerogative, theirs was the authority of the loaded gun.20 It was in this 
context that modern views about the right to strike were first shaped. 
A. The Right to Strike in the “Open Shop” Era 
The period of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was 
the era of the “open shop,” a term popularized by employers who 
sought to present their opposition to unions as some sort of libertarian 
indifference to union membership marked, too, by their scrupulous 
deference to their workers’ wishes on the subject. In fact, the open 
shop was largely an artifact of propaganda, one that fraudulently 
misrepresented what was in fact implacable hostility to unionism. As 
Clarence Darrow put it, the open shop was less about “some principle 
of liberty and justice,” and more about employers’ “selfish ends,” 
which were better served by fending off unionism by almost any means 
necessary.21 
In grim confirmation of both Darrow’s judgment and Perlman’s 
observation, open shop employers were responsible for killing hundreds 
of unionists and seriously injuring thousands of others.22 The law did 
not directly justify many of these killings and assaults, but it gave them 
implicit sanction as almost no one was ever prosecuted for any of this. 
And it gave express sanction to the far more common practice of firing 
or blacklisting workers because they went out on strike or supported a 
union.23 Such was the implication of the doctrine of employment at 
will. Nor was this the extent of the perils that unionists had to contend 
with. Workers who struck also faced arrest, injunction, and 
prosecution, at the hands of an increasingly large and potent criminal 
justice system. 
Often enough, the pretext behind this was that the strikers had 
engaged in, or were about to engage in, some kind of violence; but 
often, too, enough violence was found to inhere in the very fact of 
 
 19.  A remarkable example of this can be found in the “Great Steel Strike” of 
1919–20, the largest strike to that point in American history, during which workers 
who deigned to stay at home were accosted in their houses by police and forced back to 
work. WILLIAM Z. FOSTER, THE GREAT STEEL STRIKE AND ITS LESSONS 135 (Arno 
1969) (1920). On the right to strike in this period, see also H.R. REP. NO. 57-183, at 
lxx-lxxiii (1901). 
 20.  SELIG PERLMAN, A THEORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT 4–5 (Porcupine 
1979) (1928). 
 21.  CLARENCE DARROW, THE OPEN SHOP 13 (1904). 
 22.  Elbridge H. Neal, The “Open” Shop, 195 N. AM. REV. 618, 619 (1912). 
 23.  See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 179 (1908). 
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striking, or at least picketing. For in this period prior to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1940 decision in Thornhill v. Alabama24 and the 
recognition of a right to picket under the First Amendment, it was not 
at all uncommon for courts to embrace in a positive way the bitter 
judgment of the organizer in Steinbeck’s story: that picketing by 
strikers was coercive provocation in and of itself, and therefore subject 
to repression by means both legal and extralegal.25 In a 1921 case called 
Truax v. Corrigan,26 the Supreme Court intimated just that.27 
Sometimes in the course of labor disputes workers augmented the 
effect of merely quitting their jobs and advertising their grievance to the 
public, and did so by engaging in boycotts or coercing “scabs” or other 
replacement workers not to cross their lines, by organizing general 
strikes, or by undertaking to defend themselves from violence visited 
on them by employers and their allies.28 But doing these things 
guaranteed they would face the full force of labor repression, again 
both legal and extralegal. These circumstances, which defined the 
course of innumerable smaller strikes, led to countless arrests, beatings, 
and prosecutions. They are also what made names like Haymarket, 
Pullman, Paint and Cabin Creek, and Ludlow such apt symbols of the 
nature of class conflict in American history.29 
Governments at every level generally supported the suppression of 
strikes. Police and prosecutors enforced the criminal laws in biased 
ways to repress strikes and undermine unionism. They also enforced in 
relatively unbiased ways laws, like “criminal syndicalism” statutes, that 
were conceived by legislatures as ways of criminalizing unionism, 
particularly in its radical incarnations, and also deterring strikes.30 And 
courts, both federal and state, went beyond upholding these actions by 
police, prosecutors, and legislators and beyond generically condemning 
the right to strike. They issued thousands of injunctions which 
 
 24.  310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
 25.  Id. at 101–02. 
 26.  257 U.S. 312 (1921). 
 27.  Id. at 327–28; see also Pre’ Catelan, Inc. v. Int’l Fed. of Workers, 188 
N.Y.S. 29, 33 (N.Y. Special Term 1921); Atchison Co. v. Gee, 139 F. 582, 584 
(C.C.S.D. Iowa 1905). 
 28.  Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880 - 
1930, 66 TEX. L. REV. 919, 947 (1988). 
 29.  Philip Taft & Philip Ross, American Labor Violence: Its Causes, 
Character, and Outcome, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 270 (Hugh D. Graham & Ted R. 
Gurr eds., 1969). For a review of the dynamics of labor repression in early twentieth 
century America, see U.S. COMM’N ON INDUS. REL., FINAL REPORT (1915). 
 30.  Taft & Ross, supra note 29, at 287; Ahmed A. White, A Different Kind 
of Labor Law: Vagrancy Law and the Regulation of Harvest Labor, 1913-1924, 75 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 667, 739–40 (2004); Ahmed A. White, The Crime of Economic 
Radicalism: Criminal Syndicalism Laws and the Repression of the Industrial Workers of 
the World, 1917-1927, 85 OR. L. REV. 649, 700–01 (2006). 
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prohibited strikes and boycotts, usually on the grounds that these acts of 
labor protest impinged on public order, individual property and contract 
rights, or the free flow of commerce.31 The federal courts in particular 
also invalidated nearly every attempt by workers and their supporters to 
advance labor rights by legislation.32 
Faced with this implacable hostility, otherwise vastly different 
elements of the labor movement adopted a deep skepticism about the 
role of the state and the value of the law as a means of advancing 
workers’ interests. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), the 
umbrella under which most unions were organized by the turn of the 
century, hewed to a “voluntarist” approach which conceived labor’s 
most important right as the right to be left alone by the state to fight its 
own battles—battles which, the federation often sought vainly to assure, 
would not involve excessively militant tactics or radical aspirations 
anyway.33 A smaller organization which nonetheless wielded an 
outsized influence, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) 
epitomized a different turn on the same theme. Founded in 1905 around 
a stridently anti-capitalist agenda, and convinced that the state and its 
legal system were inviolate servants of the ruling-class, the IWW also 
embraced “direct action,” meaning of range of strike tactics, as a better 
field of activism than political organizing or legal practice.34 Unlike the 
AFL, the IWW conceived of this as a means of toppling capitalism 
itself.35 But the IWW shared with the AFL a dominant view within the 
labor movement that realizing a right to strike was less a matter of 
embracing the protections of the law and the power of the state behind 
this than confronting the laws’ impositions and evading or undermining 
its authority.36 
Not surprisingly, most legal scholars and commentators at this 
time categorically rejected the IWW’s radicalism.37 But many endorsed 
the authorities’ nearly categorical rejection of the right to strike as well, 
 
 31.  On this history, see, for example, William E. Forbath, The Shaping of 
the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1989); Hovenkamp, supra 
note 28. 
 32.  For effective reviews of these practices, see RICHARD WHITE, THE 
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THE GILDED AGE 810–22 (2017); Laura Weinrib, The Right to Work and the Right to 
Strike, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 513, 520–24 (2017). 
 33.  This link between voluntarism and repression is particularly well 
developed by William Forbath in his story of labor injunctions. Forbath, supra note 31. 
 34.  Michael R. Johnson, The I.W.W. and Wilsonian Democracy, 28 SCI. & 
SOC’Y 257, 257–58 (1964). 
 35.  On the IWW’s attitude toward the state and its legal system, see MELVYN 
DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE 
WORLD 138–41 (1969). 
 36.  Id. at 140. 
 37.  Id. at ix. 
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even in the conventional ways that AFL unionists conceived of the 
tactic.38 Those who did deign to endorse some kind of a right to strike 
typically started from the assumption that strikes might be lawful, but if 
and only if they featured neither overt violence nor undue coercion.39 A 
typical expression of this view appeared in a 1922 issue of the Yale Law 
Journal, at the hand of liberal Democrat and civil rights lawyer 
Moorfield Storey, a Harvard Law graduate who was a friend and 
secretary to the great abolitionist Charles Sumner.40 “The right to strike 
is only the right to quit work without being liable to punishment for so 
doing,” wrote Storey, 
and that right may be taken away at any time by the 
legislature which, finding it grossly abused and the public 
suffering thereby, may restore the criminal law and make it 
again a criminal offense to combine in any attempt to interfere 
with the public service, or by striking to inflict any injury 
upon the public.41 
Despite his pretenses, in fact, what Storey really did was 
essentially to deny any right to strike that went much beyond the right 
to quit work.42 This reading of the right to strike typified the narrow 
and formal construction that many commentators imposed on the 
concept of “free labor,” that much-contested legacy of four years of 
civil war, in the decades following that conflict. It was consistent, for 
instance, with the conclusions of Joseph Feely, a prominent Boston 
lawyer who, in a 1910 article in the North American, framed his very 
limited view of the reach of the right to strike around the premise that 
“the act of the many is not the same” as the “individual act.”43 “A man 
may walk down the street as he chooses, but a body of men may not 
walk down the same street in procession without a permit from the 
public authorities.”44 
 
 38.  See, e.g., Joseph J. Feely, The Right to Strike: Its Limitations, 191 N. 
AM. REV. 644, 645–48 (1910). 
 39.  See, e.g., Alpheus T. Mason, The Right to Strike, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 52, 
53–54 (1929). 
 40.  Geoffrey D. Austrian, Moorfield Storey: Brief Life of a Patrician  
Reformer: 1845-1929, HARV. MAG. (July–Aug. 2018), 
https://www.harvardmagazine.com/2018/07/moorfield-storey [https://perma.cc/KPY5-
WFDZ]. 
 41.  Moorfield Storey, The Right to Strike, 32 YALE L.J. 99, 108 (1922). 
 42.  Id. at 100. 
 43.  Feely, supra note 38, at 646 
 44.  Id. at 644, 646; see also Paul Bourget, The Abuse of the Right to Strike, 
19 LIVING AGE 68 (1920). 
1078 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
This perspective was consistent, too, with that of other 
commentators in this period who also pretended to endorse the right to 
strike while insisting that it entailed little more than the right to quit 
work. Such a position was a staple of editorials in major newspapers 
like the New York Times and Chicago Tribune, which repeatedly 
asserted—usually in the guise of condemning broader readings of the 
right—that the right to strike was properly subject to very drastic 
restrictions and could not be conceived otherwise. This was particularly 
true in the late 1910s and early 1920s, when, amid an unprecedented 
wave of strikes across the country and increased efforts by Congress 
and the states to restrain the right to strike, there was a huge increase in 
editorials on the subject—many hundreds each year, in fact.45 In 1919 
the Tribune gave expression to a common theme among these pieces 
when it insisted that “[n]o right known to man is without limitation” 
and that the right to strike, which it quite wrongly suggested was 
“without limitation,” had to be brought under control.46 Eight months 
later, the paper brought this logic to bear in condemning a coal strike 
that enveloped its region, venturing that while “men as individuals 
cannot be forced to work, . . . men as union members” could be.47 That 
same year, the Los Angeles Times went further, declaring the use of 
strikes to create “public distress” with which to compel “employers to 
capitulate” a “crime against humanity.”48 Nor were such views the 
province only of antiunion papers, which the Tribune and the Los 
Angeles Times (like most of the big papers) both were; for that year 
even the Saint Louis Post-Dispatch, a considerably more liberal 
publication, insisted that the right to strike was not “absolute.”49 
Nevertheless, inasmuch as this framework, which so well 
vindicated drastic limits on the right to strike, also tended to 
problematize the right because it was so often exercised in an “abusive” 
way, it could also be reworked as a way of justifying and describing the 
appropriate boundaries of a rather more meaningful view of the right to 
strike. These “abuses,” in other words, could be interrogated, 
challenged, and exposed as exaggerated, unjustified, and perverse in 
 
 45.  This observation is consistent with a search of Proquest Historical 
Newspapers, which reveals that from 1906 through 1915, 119 editorials featuring the 
phrase “right to strike” appeared in all publications in that database, while from 1916 
through 1925, 326 editorials used that phrase. The same trend is evident among major 
papers, including the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, the Saint Louis Post-
Dispatch, the New York Times, and the Washington Post, where, together, the increase 
in such editorials between these two periods was from 28 to 98. 
 46.  The Right to Strike, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 3, 1919, at 8; see also The 
Right to Strike, COURIER-J. (LOUISVILLE), Nov. 1, 1919, at 4. 
 47.  Sacrificing the Right to Strike, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jul. 27, 1920, at 6. 
 48.  The Right to Strike, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1920, at I14. 
 49.  The Right to Strike, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 2, 1920, at 28. 
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their implications, which is what many champions of the right to strike 
did. They subverted the logic that Storey and Feely and so many others 
relied on to present the right to strike as something that was indeed a 
natural extension of an individual’s right to leave work (albeit 
temporarily), a corollary of the right of businesses to combine in 
pursuit of their own interests, and a practice that could actually be 
better realized precisely by limiting the reach of labor injunctions and 
reining in police and guardsmen, which made a mess of something that 
might otherwise unfold in an orderly and generally peaceable fashion.50 
For many unionists and their allies, the right to strike thereby took on a 
negative, “voluntarist,” meaning as well, as something whose existence 
depended not on what the government did to protect those who would 
strike but rather on its willingness to stay out of labor conflicts. It was 
in exactly this spirit that Samuel Gompers, longtime president of the 
AFL, opposed an attempt in 1920 by the Maryland Public Service 
Commission to institute compulsory arbitration of labor disputes by 
observing that “[l]egislation on labor questions has always had the 
tendency to circumscribe the rights of working people.”51 In fact 
Gompers and his lieutenants in the AFL repeated this argument time 
and again, insisting that restrictions on the right to strike were not only 
contrary to workers’ fundamental entitlements in a free society but also 
the very cause of much of the unrest and disorder that people like 
Storey and Feely blamed on the right to strike itself.52 
The attempt to intellectualize this position involved an interesting 
campaign to present the right to strike as a mandate of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, albeit one that, under the conservative influence of 
lawyers, was reduced to a justification of the right to quit one’s job.53 
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Less interesting but more successful was a pragmatic argument that the 
widespread use of injunctions against strikers was incompatible with 
fundamental precepts of American jurisprudence—including, for 
instance, notice and due process—and was bad social policy to boot.54 
This perspective was perhaps most fully expressed in the landmark 
critique of labor injunctions by Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, 
published in 1930, which presumed that restricting and rationalizing the 
use of injunctions would, perforce, not only enhance the right to strike 
but allow workers “to achieve the possibility of free competition with 
concentrated capital.”55 
This view that restricting injunctions would at once restore the 
right to strike and reinvigorate the labor movement had already found 
footing in Congress when Frankfurter and Greene published their book. 
An effort to limit the use of injunctions in labor disputes, both 
procedurally and substantively, was codified in the Clayton Act of 
1914. But that statute was very soon judicially emasculated, after being 
rather prematurely hailed by Gompers as labor’s “Magna Carta.”56 
Another effort of this kind came with the passage of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act of 1932,57 for which the Frankfurter and Greene book 
was essentially a brief. A more effective statute, Norris-LaGuardia did 
indeed successfully limit the power of federal courts to issue injunctions 
in labor disputes.58 It also provided some states with a model for 
enacting their own anti-injunction statutes.59 These followed earlier 
attempts at both the state and federal level to impose limits on the use 
of strikebreaking services, including, as a typical statute put it, the 
“importation of armed forces” for use in breaking a strike.60 But the 
few statutes of this kind that were enacted were limited in scope, short 
on remedies, and ultimately ineffective.61 
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Despite all these efforts, in fact, the capacity of workers to strike 
free of government interference and employer reprisals remained 
limited. Through the 1920s and well into the 1930s, workers who did 
go out on strike continued to face arrest, imprisonment, civil liability, 
discharge, blacklisting, assaults, and even death, while the annual 
number of strikes, which had reached well over 3000 a year in the 
1910s, plummeted, ranging from about 600 to 1000 a year in the 
second part of the 1920s and the early years of the 1930s.62 In line with 
this reality, the labor movement itself seemed poised on the verge of 
collapse. Partly this state of affairs reflected the limited reach and 
enforceability of the anti-strikebreaking and anti-injunction laws. But it 
also reflected the fact that that insofar as these statutes, which did not 
speak directly of the right to strike at all, did advance such a right, they 
advanced it in a fashion that was, of its nature, bound to do little more 
than codify the right of workers to quit their jobs. And that did not 
amount to much. 
B. The Right to Strike in the New Deal Era 
The New Deal and the changes in labor politics that accompanied 
its attempt to erect a new political economy which might redress the 
economic crisis which had so staggered American capitalism did not 
makes strikes any less contentious or risky for workers, at least not 
immediately. But these developments did alter the status of strikes in 
practice and in concept. Section 7(a) of the 1933 National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA), the leading legislation of the “First” New Deal, 
and various provisions of the Wagner Act (especially §§ 7 and 13), 
enacted in 1935 and in many ways the leading statute of the “Second” 
New Deal, for the first time codified a right to strike, alongside the 
other basic labor rights of self-organization and collective bargaining.63 
Never really effective anyway, as it lacked adequate enforcement 
mechanisms, § 7(a) was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court in 1935, which ruled that Title I of the NIRA exceeded 
Congress’ legislative authority; and the Wagner Act was ineffective 
until 1937, its functionality hamstrung by employers’ near universal 
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contempt for its mandates and the courts’ similarly widespread view 
that it could not possibly survive constitutional review either.64 
Nevertheless, these statutes were immediately important. Enacted 
as part of a program to rationalize and stabilize the industrial 
economy—and in the case of the Wagner Act, especially, in the face of 
vehement opposition from the business community and the press—these 
statutes reflected by far the most important attempts to establish a 
legally enforceable right to strike in America.65 In fact, § 7(a) and § 7 
employed the same language for this purpose, codifying a right of 
workers to “self-organization or in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”66 
They also prioritized this right, in the case of § 7(a) incorporating it 
within a broader attempt at corporatist economic management; and in 
the case of the Wagner Act, situating it at the center of an elaborate 
system of labor rights and making the realization of these rights 
dependent on the ability of workers to strike.67 In their different ways, 
both statutes intended, in other words, that workers would realize the 
right to organize and engage in collective bargaining, and by these 
means transform the country’s political economy, via their ability to 
mount effective strikes.68 Unlike the NIRA, though, the Wagner Act 
established a fairly robust administrative machinery to enforce these 
rights, one that empowered the National Labor Relations Board, via its 
enforcement and remedy of various “unfair labor practice[s],” to “take 
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such affirmative action including the reinstatement of employees with 
or without back pay, as will effectuate” these rights.69 
In this fashion, both statutes underwrote a broader change in labor 
discourse and politics, at the base of which was the idea that labor 
rights were not only legitimate but government-sponsored and central to 
the commonwealth. This notion was in turn central to the attempt by 
ambitious labor leaders to lay hold of the massive upsurge in rank-and-
file activism that characterized labor relations in the mid-1930s. The 
most important manifestation of this was the emergence in 1935 of the 
Committee for Industrial Organization, (later, the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations, or CIO).70 One of the great social movements 
in America history, the new labor federation built its campaign to 
organize the industrial workforce in large part on a mutual embrace of 
the New Deal state and its legal system. However, threatened for a time 
with losing its position of dominance in the labor movement to the 
upstart federation which had emerged so impertinently from its own 
ranks, the AFL shed some of its voluntarism and tentatively followed 
suit. It began, too, to seek out support among New Deal politicians 
and, eventually, from the workings of the NLRB.71 
In this context, labor leaders and organizers presented the right to 
strike as a prerogative definitely endorsed by the state, and which the 
state was bound to defend against impositions by employers. The 
culmination of this view was the extraordinary—and during the mid-
1930s, extraordinarily common—practice of using union literature, 
picket signs, and other organizing activities to present union campaigns 
and the strikes that backed them as mandates of the New Deal.72 As 
remarkable as it might seem, this new turn by unionists away from the 
voluntarism that prevailed earlier in the century actually aligned with 
the views of many New Deal scholars, commentators, and government 
officials, who also viewed the right to strike as a perquisite defined by 
and protected through the offices of the state. Many of these figures in 
turn viewed the defense of the right to strike as a means of defending 
the New Deal. 
Among the most prominent representatives of this tendency were 
the authors of Wagner Act itself, including Senator Robert Wagner, as 
well as his key assistant on the bill, economist and lawyer Leon 
Keyserling. On the one hand, in line with the overall structure of the 
Act, Wagner and Keyserling presented the legislation as a means of 
regulating and even diminishing strikes; on the other hand, and more 
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importantly, they conceived of strikes, and therefore the right to strike, 
as fundamental to a statute that would not only, paradoxically, reduce 
strikes, but also advance the more critical aims of increasing workers’ 
bargaining power, improving workers’ material conditions, sustaining 
consumer demand, and reforming the workplace.73 As Keyserling 
emphasized—revealingly for our purposes—among the important 
vectors of opposition to the law was the claim by those “on the left . . . 
who argued that it would lead inevitably to the destruction of free trade 
unionism through the intervention of government.”74 
Equally reflective of this view of the right to strike as central to a 
government-sponsored reordering of the political and economic order 
was the work of the so-called La Follette Committee. A subcommittee 
of the U.S. Senate Committee on Education and Labor under the 
leadership of Senator Robert La Follette Jr., who had been a strong 
supporter of the Wagner Act in Congress, the La Follette Committee 
undertook a series of investigations of labor repression and employer 
contempt for the Wagner Act.75 Conducted between 1936 and 1941, 
these investigations documented systematic “violations of the rights of 
free speech and . . . the right[s] of labor” which, in large part by 
undermining the right to strike, also undermined the validity and 
functionality of the labor law.76 And then, too, there was the NLRB 
itself. Under the leadership of a group of leftist lawyers between 1935 
and 1939, the NLRB aggressively defended the right to strike.77 With 
an obvious sense that an effective right to strike was crucial to the 
entire regime of labor law, the agency’s staff went to considerable 
lengths to protect strikers from reprisals by employers and government 
officials.78 
To be sure, the Wagner Act defined the right to strike in terms that 
were not only ambiguous but surprisingly negative in their own ways. 
Beyond § 7’s declaration that workers had the right “to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection” there was § 13, which provided that nothing 
in the Act should be construed to “impede or diminish in any way the 
right to strike.”79 Nevertheless, it is important to stress, the statute did 
conceive of the prerogative to strike as a right and not merely as 
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something that might thrive if the other impediments that weighed on it 
were diminished.80 And of course it also established an agency, the 
NLRB, to enforce this right and the labor law more broadly. So it was 
that under the Wagner Act, the right to strike became, in the fashion of 
other government protections of the interest of workers and the poor 
during this period of ascendance of social democracy and the welfare 
state, a right to be defended by defending the power of the state to 
regulate labor relations, by protecting the legitimacy of the Wagner 
Act, and by defending the authority of the NLRB to administer the 
Act.81 In a prosaic but very meaningful way, this is what made the 
Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,82 
which at once upheld the Wagner Act and legitimated the New Deal 
itself, seem so crucial, even as it made the right to strike seem 
evermore dependent on the active sponsorship of the state.83 In all these 
ways, the right to strike assumed the rough parameters of its 
contemporary meaning. 
These important changes in the legal, political, and scholarly 
conceptions of the right to strike occurred alongside a dramatic increase 
in the incidence of strikes beginning in the mid-1930s. There had been 
massive strike waves in the late nineteenth century and again in the late 
1910s.84 But the incidence of strikes fell dramatically in the 1920s as 
repression did its work and many in the union movement seemed 
resigned to defeat.85 This retrenchment continued though the first, grim 
years of the Depression. There were fewer than 900 strikes a year from 
1930 through 1932; and the great majority of these were desperate 
affairs in protest of rampant wage cuts and deteriorated working 
conditions.86 But things changed quickly. In 1933, there were 1700 
strikes, and then an average of about 3000 a year over the following ten 
years—notwithstanding the wartime no-strike pledge subscribed by 
most unions during the latter part of this period.87 And a large number 
(in some years a majority) were organizing strikes. During 1937, which 
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is probably the single most critical year in American labor history, the 
government counted 4740 strikes involving over seven percent of the 
working population.88 
Both § 7(a) and the Wagner Act were shaped by this increase in 
labor activism at least as much as they influenced and inspired such 
activism. Section 7(a) was most certainly enacted in response to 
pressures from the labor movement and its political allies.89 The same is 
true of the Wagner Act. As activist and scholar Staughton Lynd has 
noted, the impetus to enact the Wagner Act in particular “waxed and 
waned in direct correlation with the waxing and waning of the strike 
wave of 1934–35.”90 
In fact, both § 7(a) and the Wagner Act were explicitly aimed at 
rationalizing and ultimately reducing labor conflict. This agenda, which 
was most clearly reflected in the first section of the Wagner Act, 
coexisted uneasily alongside the statute’s purpose in rationalizing 
industrial production as well as its aim to diminish economic inequality 
and advance workers’ rights for their own sake.91 In its conception, it 
encompassed the ironic but very plausible idea—which was actually 
consistent with the vision of voluntarism articulated by Gompers and 
the AFL a generation earlier—that protecting the right to strike would 
serve as a way of diminishing the intensity and even the frequency of 
strikes. Nevertheless, the Wagner Act would end up being asserted as a 
limit on the right to strike. In Jones & Laughlin itself, the Court’s 
majority took the opportunity to valorize labor peace, to invoke it as the 
essential, legitimate purpose behind the Congress’ enactment of the 
statute. “Experience has abundantly demonstrated,” wrote Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes, “that the recognition of the right of employees 
to self-organization and to have representatives of their own choosing 
for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition 
of industrial peace.”92 A functional labor law, Hughes made clear, was 
above all a way of avoiding strikes.93 In the process the Court did 
exactly the thing that Senator Wagner, who thought peaceful industrial 
relations were one purpose of the Act, had feared, which was to elevate 
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this aim over the statute’s more fundamental purpose “to make the 
worker a free man.”94 
It is not difficult to comprehend the mechanisms at work in these 
developments. These Depression-era strikes were the lifeblood of a 
labor movement that, by the end of 1936 and the beginning of 1937, 
was not only reborn but was rapidly surging to unprecedented strength. 
Aimed so often at organizing large numbers of industrial workers who 
had never been successfully organized, and so often successful, the 
strikes led to rapid growth in the labor movement, with total 
membership increasing from 2.9 million in 1933, to 8.9 million in 
1940, to 14.8 million in 1945.95 In this way, the strikes were central to 
the rise of powerful industrial unions like the United Automobile 
Workers (UAW) and the United Steelworkers of America (USWA). In 
a related but more attenuated fashion, the strikes also contributed to a 
dramatic shift in American politics. For not only did unions like the 
UAW and USWA later play a central role in mainstream liberal politics 
in the twentieth century, but as these CIO unions emerged, CIO 
funding and voter mobilization contributed directly to the landslide 
victories that Roosevelt and New Dealers across the country realized in 
the 1936 election and, by this means, inaugurated the bond between the 
labor movement and the Democratic party that would define and 
structure the union movement’s political relevance in the decades 
ahead.96 
The CIO led the biggest, most iconic strikes of this period. And its 
emergence and subsequent growth initially accounted for most of the 
increase in union membership in the mid and late 1930s. But by 1937, 
too, the AFL, so long moribund, was also gaining membership, in part 
on the strength of a new-found faith in strikes.97 By then it was even 
using right-to-strike rhetoric to prosecute its rivalry with the CIO, 
criticizing what it regarded as the NLRB’s pro-CIO bias as a denial of 
the right to strike.98 These AFL strikes were generally less militant, 
though. And in employing them, the AFL seemed to benefit from a 
sense among employers and many in the government that at least it was 
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not the CIO, whose greater militancy and overtly social democratic 
politics cast the AFL in a more politically acceptable light. 
Nonetheless, it was these CIO strikes that demonstrated not only to 
Congress but to the courts and other reactionary elements of the state 
the considerable risks of continued opposition to labor reform. As both 
Pope and Drew Hansen have argued persuasively, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the Jones & Laughlin case cannot be understood apart from 
the Justices’ apprehensions about where this remarkable upsurge of 
labor militancy might lead if the Wagner Act were not upheld, which 
looms as important in this regard as the President’s court-packing 
scheme and the magnitude of his and other New Deal candidates’ 
landslide victories in the 1936 election.99 Jones & Laughlin was in turn 
critical in giving constitutional legitimacy to the New Deal. In fact, it 
seems certain that the militancy of this era was as important to the 
survival of the New Deal as was the New Deal important to the rise of 
the modern labor movement. And yet even then militancy was 
understood as a threat that best be muted and contained by the 
validation of a functional system of labor law. Not only did the 
effective use of the right to strike not legitimate itself; as the Jones & 
Laughlin decision made so clear, it created the conditions for its own 
invalidation in the name of an effective system of labor rights. 
The surge in labor conflict that shaped all these events did not end 
in April 1937, which is when the Court’s Jones & Laughlin decision 
came down, or even with the coming of the Second World War, despite 
a pledge subscribed by both the major labor federations, the AFL and 
the CIO, to suspend strikes during the conflict. After falling off 
somewhat during and just after the devastating “Roosevelt Recession” 
of 1937–38, the escalation in strikes continued well into the 1940s.100 In 
fact, the end of the war brought on the greatest number of strikes in 
American history—over five million workers went out on strike 
between the middle of 1945 and the end of 1946.101 Over the course of 
this sustained surge in labor militancy, basic labor rights expressed in 
the Wagner Act became increasingly secure, as we shall see, even as 
the right to strike was increasingly circumscribed by statute and by 
judicial and administrative rulings. 
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C. The Right to Strike in Times of Détente and Decline 
Even though strikes remained surprisingly frequent in the decade 
that followed the New Deal and the war, they diminished dramatically 
in militancy and resulted in no great clashes, let alone any spectacular 
upsurges, on par with those of the New Deal period.102 Already by the 
late 1940s, in fact, a change had arrived, one whose significance can be 
witnesses in the steel industry, where a history of bitter conflict, book-
ended by the infamous Homestead dispute in 1882 and the dramatic and 
tragic “Little Steel” Strike in 1937, had claimed scores of lives and 
resulted in countless injuries and thousands of arrests.103 Largely 
unionized by the CIO in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the industry 
continued in the postwar period to feature some of the biggest strikes in 
American history. But by then the industry’s strikes had become by 
contrast very tame, almost ritualistic affairs concerned mainly with 
contract negotiations. During the industry-wide 1949 walkout a 
somewhat incredulous Mary Heaton Vorse, a popular, leftist labor 
journalist of the day who had witnessed the carnage of earlier strikes 
first-hand, now found picket stations constructed from lumber donated 
by management, appointed with radios and heaters provided by the 
companies, and provisioned at company expense with doughnuts and 
coffee.104 
During this new era in labor relations, which ran roughly from 
1950 to the early 1970s, working conditions also improved substantially 
across industries; and union membership, which increased quickly in 
the late 1930s and 1940s, continued to rise, albeit more on the strength 
of job growth in previously unionized workplaces than because of 
continued success in organizing open shop industries.105 By the mid-
1950s, roughly one-third of eligible workers, and nearly one-fifth of all 
adults, were unionized; and from that point through 1960s, total union 
membership hovered just below 20 million.106 This accompanied the 
resolution of the AFL versus CIO schism that had raged since the latter 
federation formed. And it featured the consolidation of the labor 
movement as the key institutional pillar of the Democratic Party and the 
standard-bearer of postwar liberal politics.107 
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As labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein has recently reminded 
readers, it is important not to mistake the relative stability and quiet of 
this period, let alone the increased influence of the labor movement, for 
a suspension of class conflict, which still expressed itself in 
considerable, low-level discord.108 Nevertheless, things had changed 
and a period of relative détente was at hand. Not surprisingly, under 
these conditions the concept’s essential integrity was taken for granted. 
Embracing a newly dominant ideology steeped in visions of “industrial 
pluralism” and the permanent management of labor discord, most labor 
scholars did not bother with the subject at all, except in a rather 
technical way that, in contrast to earlier ruminations on the subject, 
decoupled the right to strike from pressing concerns about the fate of 
the labor movement or the survival of the New Deal. They foreswore 
all interest in the relationship between strikes and existential concerns 
of the sort that Steinbeck, among others, had posed.109 
From this novel vantage, the right to strike was, in the suitably dry 
language of one of the apostles of this new perspective, Harvard law 
professor Archibald Cox, nothing more than “the concerted cessation of 
work by agreement among employees for the purpose of inflicting upon 
their employer losses sufficient to induce him [sic] to grant the terms 
that they demand.”110 In Cox’s view, there had been a perhaps 
unwarranted shift in the 1940s to the view that “the law has a useful 
role to play in the conflicts of interest between employers and 
employees,” but this reflected in part “the conviction that unions 
sometimes pursued objectives quite inconsistent with accepted notions 
of fairness and sound policy, and sometimes used weapons that ought to 
be banned.”111 Among these offensive weapons: “mass picketing and 
extreme forms of secondary boycott.”112 
The article by Cox from which the preceding quotations are taken 
delves into the constitutional status of the right to strike and picket; and 
it cites with evident approval Justice Louis Brandeis’s dictum from the 
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1926 case Dorchy v. Kansas113 that there is no absolute right to strike. 
The full quotation of Brandeis—“Neither the common law, nor the 
Fourteenth Amendment, confers the absolute right to strike,” he 
wrote—appears in dozens of articles and commentaries on the right to 
strike from the 1950s and 1960s.114 And not because it is a catchy 
phrase—it really is not—but because it so provided an appealing way to 
frame what many people had come to think about the right to strike in 
the postwar period. 
Cox was as famous a labor scholar as one could find, at a time 
when labor scholars enjoyed considerable prominence in academia.115 
He was also, along with fellow Harvard professor John Dunlop, 
famously antipathetic to the right to strike, which the two men argued 
was legitimately qualified by law in various ways and could be freely 
waived by unions in collective bargaining.116 A less conspicuous but 
equally revealing example of this standpoint can be found in a 1950 
article in the American Bar Association Journal by former NLRB 
lawyer George Rose, who inveighed that while the right to strike might 
be the “prerogative of all free peoples,” the right was not absolute.117 
Rather, taking the empirically dubious but not-uncommon view that 
unions and employers were now roughly on par in economic power—a 
view that ironically rested on the idea that unions wielded massive 
power by their ability to strike—Rose claimed that the right to strike 
was burdened with layers of responsibility to the public.118 It was a 
prerogative that put unions and employers “on trial to demonstrate and 
confess the sincerity of their belief in the democratic process.”119 This 
was in many ways an injunction to both sides to allow disputes to result 
in strikes, if at all, with the understanding that these events would 
unfold like the steel strike that left Mary Heaton Vorse so surprised.120 
A few years later in the same journal, Rose attacked the “myth” that 
the notorious Taft-Hartley (Labor Management Relations) Act of 1947, 
which had radically amended the Wagner Act, was a “union busting” 
statute.121 He did this in part by insisting that despite Taft-Hartley’s 
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dramatic impositions on the right to strike—matters we will turn to 
shortly—the statute somehow left that right in perfectly good 
standing.122 
Other scholars and commentators joined Cox, Dunlop, and Rose in 
suggesting that while the right to strike was a legitimate notion, it was 
subject to a number of equally legitimate constraints which, in pursuit 
of a functional system of labor rights, the courts, the Board, and the 
public should all take seriously.123 In so doing, they also followed the 
courts and the NLRB, whose rulings hewed to a similar approach which 
confirmed the right to strike but, as we shall see more of shortly, 
qualified it by a slew of mandates to ensure that it was exercised 
responsibly, which is to say in line with newly reaffirmed notions of 
property and order. 
There were some expressions of concern about the viability of the 
right to strike in this period, albeit enclosed less in worries about 
workers’ immediate interests, which generally seemed to be advancing, 
and more in concerns about how those interests were being advanced 
and whether this could be sustained. For instance, George Rose’s rather 
casual dismissal of Taft-Hartley’s effects on labor rights was refuted in 
the same journal a year later by the prescient anticipations of a labor 
lawyer named Robert Gilbert, who predicted that the aggressive use of 
the statute’s provisions would decimate union membership.124 Likewise, 
in a 1960 speech at Yale Law School, New York labor lawyer Henry 
Mayer warned that the right to strike was being simultaneously 
“diluted” and threatened with displacement by a semi-corporatist 
system of government-managed labor disputes inconsistent with 
“democracy” and a “free society.”125 In fact, Mayer was one of a 
number of commentators who worried that the right to strike, and with 
it the independence of the labor movement, was being consumed by the 
era’s turn to what others have called “soft corporatism” in the 
management of labor conflict.126 
Come the mid-1970s, though, there would be little further talk of 
the dangers of corporatism or industrial pluralism. For by then, the 
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labor movement found itself again locked in bitter conflicts not only 
over the terms of exploitation—wages and hours and the like—but 
increasingly over more fundamental issues, including the movement’s 
very right to exist in a meaningful way. Things had changed again and 
they had changed quickly. Driven by a transformed political economy 
that countenanced fewer concessions to workers, and that was backed 
by a new orthodoxy in economic thought, new approaches in 
management and management-side labor law practice, and new and 
powerful business lobbying institutions like the Business Roundtable 
(founded in 1972), employers resumed aggressively contesting union 
representation.127 
In prosecuting this approach, employers relied on both lawful 
tactics like hard bargaining, refusals to recognize unions without an 
NLRB-sponsored election, and aggressive antiunion propaganda, as 
well unlawful means, like firings of union organizers and the willful 
refusal to bargain in good faith. Workers responded with a wave of 
strikes which almost rivaled in numbers the big strike waves of the 
1930s and 1940s.128 But employers had ample means of countering 
these tactics. Invoking a prerogative that the Supreme Court (and the 
NLRB) had endorsed back in 1938—but which relatively few employers 
had used in the interim—they resorted with increasing frequency to the 
use of permanent replacement workers, thus presenting workers with 
the very real prospect of losing their jobs if they went out on strike.129 
Employers also invoked other rights under the labor law, as it now 
existed; they aggressively accused strikers of prohibited forms of 
misconduct, fired them, filed unfair labor practice charges against them 
with the NLRB, and enjoined them with court orders.130 
This change in circumstances set up a one-sided contest in which 
strikes were soon being defeated with such regularity that many 
employers embraced work stoppages as a weapon of their own. They 
began to provoke strikes (or resort to lockouts) as a method for 
destroying union representation and deterring workers from challenging 
them in any way. As this increasingly unequal struggle extended into 
the 1980s and 1990s, union membership plummeted, along with the 
influence of individual unions and the overall strength of the labor 
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movement.131 So did the number of strikes. It was at this point that 
strikes receded to levels which have not been seen since the birth of 
modern labor relations in post-bellum Industrial America, on their way 
to nearly disappearing entirely. Not coincidentally, the political and 
economic conditions of the working class, which had improved steadily 
in the postwar period, began to deteriorate—for some workers, very 
drastically.132 
As these developments unfolded, labor scholars began, yet again, 
to concern themselves in a different way with the right to strike. 
Viewing the decline in strikes as a major factor in the decline in the 
fortunes of the working class and the weakening of the labor 
movement, they bewailed this development; and they attributed it to a 
host of legal changes that seemed to have narrowed the circumstances 
under which workers could strike.133 Of these there many ready objects 
of blame. There was the replacement worker doctrine, the so-called 
Mackay Radio rule, as well as the prerogative under the labor law to 
punish workers for supposed strike-related misconduct.134 There was 
the enforcement of state and local criminal laws and civil liability, as 
well as the issuance of injunctions against strikers.135 There was the 
multi-faceted prohibition on secondary boycotts. And there was, too, 
the doctrine—which evolved out of a trilogy of 1960 Supreme Court 
decisions involving the USWA and reached its apogee with a 1970 
case, Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770136—which 
made it unlawful for workers to strike over any issue covered by an 
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement, even if the 
contracts made no express waiver of this kind.137 This all formed, 
together, a comprehensive legal assault on the right to strike, one that 
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lay at the root of the labor movement’s travails in the latter decades of 
the twentieth century.138 
Significantly, in defending an effective right to strike against these 
impositions, the scholars who advanced this argument not only 
venerated the labor militancy of the New Deal period and (in some 
cases, at least) the years that immediately followed it; they also hewed 
to a framework that had predominated since the New Deal, one that 
saw the ability of workers to strike in an effective way as dependent on 
this prerogative’s integrity as a right. In so doing, these scholars 
declined to indict liberalism and its legal system themselves for their 
reign over labor relations, even though, ironically, this critique has 
always been implicit in all the most important representatives of this 
work. Instead, theirs was necessarily an appeal to liberalism itself, one 
that asked as we shall see shortly, that it somehow renounce its own 
fundamental values in this realm in favor of the interests of workers, 
and use its legal system to implement this agenda. This attempt to 
defend labor’s interests in liberal, legalistic terms might well have made 
sense if, as it presupposes, there had once been an effective right to 
strike which validated all these possibilities. But as it turns out, this 
supposition is highly problematic. For the kinds of strikes that built the 
labor movement in the 1930s and 1940s, and that these critics (for the 
most part) rightly anticipate seem necessary to save the movement 
today, were never really construable as rights anyway. At least not in 
any practical, enduring way, as a closer look at the reality of strikes 
from this period shows. 
II. THE TRIUMPH OF EFFECTIVE STRIKES AND THE STILLBIRTH OF AN 
EFFECTIVE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
The period from the mid-1930s until the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act in 1947 represented the first time that American workers 
were able to strike effectively. In this period, as we have seen, strikes 
not only revivified the labor movement, overthrew the open shop, and 
led to improved labor conditions for millions of workers, but also 
played a crucial role in effectuating the Wagner Act and validating the 
New Deal. However, this would be the only time that American 
workers could strike effectively. For even as effective strikes changed 
the world in all these ways, they could not validate themselves in law. 
Far from it, in fact. The very tactics that made these strikes effective—
sit-down strikes and mass picketing, as well as, to some extent, other 
tactics like secondary boycotts—made them too disorderly and too 
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destructive to be certified or even tolerated in this fashion. The courts 
and the Congress, especially, saw to this. As a close review of this 
paradoxical and important turn in history makes clear, the triumph of 
effective strikes was in fact marked by the stillbirth of an effective right 
to strike. 
A. Effective Strikes and the Law—from the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley 
Nowhere was this paradoxical turn clearer than in regard to the sit-
down strikes. Although there had been sit-down strikes earlier in the 
century and a few earlier in the Depression era (including a prominent 
one in Austin, Minnesota in 1933 and a number of brief, “quickie” sit-
downs in Cleveland and Toledo in 1934), the practice began to come 
into its own in 1936, when there were significant sit-downs in rubber 
factories and automobile parts and assembly plants in Ohio and 
Indiana.139 The signature event of this sort was the great General 
Motors sit-down strike, which began on the second-to-last day of the 
year, 1936, in Flint, Michigan, and which forced that company—a 
leader in labor repression, an anchor of the open shop, and the largest 
corporation in the world—to recognize the UAW.140 
An electrifying episode that ranks among the most important 
events in American history, it was this strike that played the key role in 
influencing the Supreme Court to follow through in upholding the 
constitutionality of Wagner Act (and thus the entire New Deal) later 
that spring, in the landmark Jones & Laughlin Steel decision.141 The 
strike also sent to countless open shop employers a clear message that 
maybe the time had come to acknowledge the inevitability of unionism. 
Indeed, from many vantages, the militancy of the GM strike, combined 
with the fact that it was led by unabashed leftists, portended a general 
uprising against the rule of capital that was best preempted by sensible 
compromise.142 
One reason for this is that the GM strike was not the only affair of 
this kind at this crucial period in labor history. There were hundreds of 
sit-down strikes in the Second New Deal period, concentrated in the 
first half of 1937 and no doubt inspired in part by the GM strike. 
According to the U.S. Labor Department, approximately one in ten 
strikes—477 out of 4740—that year were sit-down strikes; in March 
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alone there were 170.143 And they were decisive in defeating the open 
shop across a vast range of industries, including the manufacture of 
farm equipment, steel, and rubber; lumber and mining; ocean shipping; 
as well as a host of service industries.144 A remarkable eighty percent 
were at least partially successful, despite their concentration at open 
shop firms that had most vigorously resisted labor rights, defied the 
Wagner Act, and had been the forefront of a concerted campaign to 
overturn the entire New Deal.145 This reflected the enormous tactical 
advantages that these strikes conveyed in comparison to conventional 
strikes: they preempted the running of struck businesses, thus negating 
the demoralizing and resource-exhausting use of replacement workers; 
at a time when conventional picketers were often overwhelmed with 
armed force, they placed the strikers in defensible positions; they made 
hostages of the building and equipment of the struck business; and in a 
context where many workers were afraid to support unionism even if 
they agreed with it, the strikes could be executed by relatively small 
numbers of union stalwarts.146 
The sit-down strikes were never widely accepted as legitimate 
though, despite earnest and creative attempts by some unionists and 
their champions to justify them in legal terms.147 Early on, many 
authorities elected not to challenge the strikers or else did so in clumsy 
or half-hearted ways.148 The GM strike succeeded in part because 
neither the Roosevelt Administration nor state forces under the control 
of Michigan Governor Frank Murphy intervened forcefully to oust the 
strikers.149 But later in 1937 strikes like these were increasingly 
suppressed by local and state police, who were armed not only with 
truncheons and gas, but with judicial injunctions and criminal laws that 
affirmed the struck employers’ rights to exclude the workers.150 In fact, 
such repression became more frequent and aggressive after the strikes 
compelled GM, Chrysler, and U.S. Steel (which abandoned the open 
shop in March 1937, in part out of fear of sit-down strikes) to abide 
their workers’ labor rights, and after the Jones & Laughlin decision 
positioned the NLRB as a proper and functional venue for resolving 
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labor conflicts.151 It seems clear that as the labor law gained validity 
and as the labor movement gained power, employers and their allies 
moved quickly to present themselves, not as lawless and immoral 
adversaries of hard-pressed workers, but as the victims of a legal 
regime and labor movement that imposed far too much on their rights 
and on the interests of the commonwealth. It is significant in this light 
that opponents of the strikes did not usually condemn or seek to break 
the sit-down strikes in the name of capitalist hegemony or in categorical 
defiance of the labor law. The strikes had to be suppressed, they said, 
deploying the rhetoric of open shop opponents of the right to strike, 
because they were unlawful violations of public order and the rights of 
property, and also because they transgressed the limits of legitimate 
labor rights.152 
Neither the text of the Wagner Act nor its legislative history 
addressed the question of sit-down strikes, or even the broader issue of 
the limits of strike militancy. Instead, there are a couple of relevant 
passages in the legislative history that deal with the question of coercion 
and criminality in general.153 Among these is a statement by the act’s 
main sponsor, Senator Wagner himself, in which Wagner denied that 
the statute should have been seen as establishing a separate police 
function.154 “To saddle upon the National Labor Relations Board the 
duty to prevent ‘coercion’ by labor unions or employees would create a 
superfluous remedy for wrongs simply dealt with today by police courts 
and by injunctive relief in Federal and State courts,” he said.155 
Moreover, such a move would threaten to overwhelm the NLRB and 
give “new congressional sanction to those many old decisions which 
have banned peaceful picketing, the mere threat to strike, and even the 
circularization of banners, on the ground that they were ‘coercive.’”156 
And, he said, referring to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it would force the 
worker back into the “bondage that existed before that humane piece of 
legislation was enacted.”157 But by the same token, Wagner and other 
sponsors of the legislation also insisted that the Wagner Act would do 
nothing to displace the authority of police and courts to deal with 
violence and unrest. Both House and Senate reports on the legislation 
subscribed to the view that “[t]he remedies against such acts in the State 
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and Federal courts and by the invocation of local police authorities are 
now adequate, as arrests and labor injunctions in industrial disputes 
throughout the country will attest.”158 
It requires but little critical judgment to see in this active deferral 
to the authority of police and courts a deference as well to the sanctity 
of property and order, at least in every practical sense. For the defense 
of these institutions has always been at the very center of what police 
and courts evolved to do. Such functions had defined what police and 
courts had done in the fields of labor conflict in the half-century 
preceding the New Deal. And despite limits imposed on courts by the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act,159 this continued to be the case in the years 
immediately surrounding the enactment of the Wagner Act. Senator 
Wagner and his liberal colleagues no doubt knew this, just as they had 
to know that, if not the Wagner Act or the NLRB, nothing else was 
positioned to divert the police and the courts from these functions. 
The full implications of these notions would soon be made evident. 
For several years in the late 1930s, the NLRB walked a thin line. It 
refused to categorically condemn the strikes as unlawful or to give them 
broad sanction.160 Instead, deferring to the notion that it was not the 
agency’s business to censure the misconduct inherent in such strikes, it 
typically ordered fired sit-down strikers reinstated, provided their 
actions had been sufficiently provoked or were otherwise not 
excessively violent.161 The key example of this was a relatively 
extended and disorderly, though not especially bloody and altogether 
innocuous, sit-down strike at a small specialty steel manufacturer called 
Fansteel Metallurgical in suburban Chicago, in the winter of 1937.162 
As was so often the case, the strikers seized the company’s property in 
a desperate bid to compel the company to abide their rights under the 
Wagner Act.163 Armed with an injunction and a small army of police to 
enforce it, the employer eventually ousted them, fired many of them, 
and cooperated with the court in having dozens found in criminal 
contempt and thrown in jail.164 
What the strikers had done was wrong, the agency notably 
conceded; but a balancing of the equities and the need to effectuate the 
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purposes of the Wagner Act and abide its prohibition on firing workers 
for going out on strike, mandated that it order the strikers’ 
reinstatement. In line with its usual approach, the agency disclaimed 
giving any general sanction to sit-down strikes.165 It admitted refusing 
to reinstate strikers in other cases involving criminal behavior, 
including some sit-down strike cases, but insisted those were more 
serious cases than the one at hand. That thirty-seven strikers (and two 
union organizers) in this instance were jailed and fined for criminal 
contempt of a judge’s order to quit the plant was, in the agency’s view, 
not really its business—even though this concession made it someone 
else’s business to moot everything the NLRB might do for these 
workers.166 
The case made its way to the Supreme Court.167 In an opinion by 
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the Court rejected the NLRB’s 
attempt to justify the strikers’ reinstatement.168 Hughes’ decision was a 
comprehensive defeat for the strikers and the NLRB.169 They were not 
entitled to reinstatement and their firing deprived the union of any claim 
to represent a majority of workers at the plant, putting to rest any claim 
that the employer was bound to recognize and bargain with the union—
the very things that led to the strike in the first place.170 Hughes’ 
reasoning rested firmly on the inviolate nature of the employer’s 
property rights and the importance of order, which he used to brush 
aside the NLRB’s reasoning that its decision to order the reinstatement 
of the strikers rested on its expertise and its careful balancing of the 
equities in a case involving two sides that had done wrong.171 In 
Hughes’ view, 
the ousting of the owner from lawful possession is not 
essentially different from an assault upon the officers of an 
employing company, or the seizure and conversion of its 
goods, or the despoiling of its property, or other unlawful acts 
in order to force compliance with demands. To justify such 
conduct because of the existence of a labor dispute or of an 
unfair labor practice would be to put a premium on resort to 
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force, instead of legal remedies, and to subvert the principles 
of law and order which lie at the foundations of society.172 
“Nor is it questioned that the seizure and retention of respondent’s 
property were unlawful,” he wrote.173 “It was a high-handed 
proceeding without shadow of legal right.”174 
NLRB v. Fansteel was not unanimous.175 But Justice Stanley 
Reed’s dissent, which attempted to uphold the NLRB’s reinstatement of 
the strikers, actually represented a different way of deferring to similar 
values.176 For Reed, the issue in Fansteel was not whether the strikers 
had acted legally, for they had not, but rather whether the Court should 
second-guess the NLRB’s authority to sort out the equities in cases, like 
this one, where both parties had “erred grievously.”177 As Reed 
appreciated, there could be no justifying what the strikers had done—
not in law, at least, and not before courts that deferred, above all, to 
the sanctity of property and order.178 Although the question of how far 
state and local authorities could go in regulating strikes without being 
preempted by the federal labor law was also not quite settled in these 
early years, there was little doubt that they enjoyed considerable 
authority to suppress the sit-down strikes by police action. By the 
1950s, it would be completely clear that states faced almost no 
impediments at all in this regard—not when dealing with threats to 
property and order.179 
Above all, Fansteel established the illegality and unprotected 
character of sit-down strikes. In its wake, employers fired hundreds of 
strikers and police and other authorities accelerated their suppression of 
the strike.180 But Fansteel also had a broader relevance. It made clear 
that strikes in violation of state law, particularly those in violation of 
state criminal laws, were illegitimate and that those who participated in 
them were at least presumptively unprotected from discharge. 
Likewise, beyond extending the ruling in Fansteel to seamen, the 
Court’s decision in Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB181 three years later 
had the broader effect of establishing that strikes in violation of federal 
laws or “policies”—in this instance, an archaic mutiny statute, enacted 
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a century before the Wagner Act and invoked (the strikers never faced 
any charges of this kind) in the case of peaceful, dockside strikers who, 
in protesting their employer’s flagrant violation of their labor rights, 
simply refused to make the ship ready to sail—were also illegal and 
unprotected.182 
In that case, too, the dissenters among the Supreme Court justices, 
in line with the NLRB itself, did not deign to suggest that the strikers 
had a right to seize the ship, let alone do so in a disorderly way; rather, 
they hinged their argument on the assertion that the strike was not a 
seizure, not disorderly, and of course not a sit-down strike within in the 
meaning of Fansteel.183 And yet even this argument failed in the face of 
a political and juridical reality, embraced by the Court’s majority in 
that case, too, that labor rights are subordinate to property rights and 
the right of employers to own and control their workplaces.184 
Indeed, the federal courts were hardly alone in taking such a 
stance. State courts, too, condemned sit-down strikes in exactly the 
fashion of Justice Hughes. In 1939, for instance, in a case involving an 
injunction against a “one man sit-down strike” on an oil rig, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court cited Fansteel, noting that the strike in that 
case did not involve  
the exercise of “the right to strike” to which the [Wagner] Act 
referred. It was not a mere quitting of work and statement of 
grievances in the exercise of pressure recognized as lawful. It 
was an illegal seizure of the buildings in order to prevent their 
use by the employer in a lawful manner and thus by acts of 
force and violence to compel the employer to submit.185  
Because the strike in Fansteel was unprotected, so was this one-man 
strike.186 
Mass picketing was also an integral, though often overlooked, 
factor in the remarkable expansion of labor rights and union 
representation in the Depression era and in the years that followed it. 
Though somewhat less dramatic this practice was also far more 
common and persisted for much longer than the sit-down strikes. On 
countless occasions in the 1930s and 1940s, strikers gathered in large 
numbers, sometimes even in the hundreds or thousands, at struck 
businesses.187 By their teeming and often threatening presence, 
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picketers were consistently able to deter the use of scabs and shutter 
struck businesses, thereby impressing fence-sitting workers with the 
strength of their movement and forcing employers to respect their rights 
under the labor law and meet their terms in collective bargaining.188 
Like sitting down on the job, mass picketing was a strike-winning 
tactic.189 
No better example can be found than in the conflict that followed 
at Jones & Laughlin Steel Company itself, after the Supreme Court 
rejected the company’s challenge to the constitutionality of the Wagner 
Act.190 The Court’s decision, handed down April 12, 1937, came in the 
middle of a drive by CIO unionists to organize the company’s two big 
steel plants in Pennsylvania.191 Marked by relentless, sometimes violent 
resistance on the part of the company, this push for unionization was 
hardly settled by that decision, the main import of which was simply 
that the Wagner Act was constitutional. Instead, in keeping with the 
logic of the Wagner Act, the Court’s decision left the matter to be 
decided by the relative economic strength of the parties. And so it was, 
as the conflict devolved into a massive strike focused at the company’s 
plant in Aliquippa and occurring about a month after the Court’s 
decision.192 Thousands of unionists turned out.193 Armed with clubs and 
sticks, they blocked all entrances and forced the massive complex to 
close down.194 Unable to break the siege despite the formidable means 
of labor repression at their disposal, and fearful the company would be 
driven out of business if they did not end the strike and reopen soon, 
company leaders capitulated.195 They agreed to sign a favorable 
collective bargaining agreement contingent on the outcome of an 
NLRB-sponsored election, held several weeks later, which the union 
won decisively.196 
Mass picketing on a comparable scale was used to press big 
industrial employers in other cases in the late 1930s and early 1940s. A 
strike at General Motors in Cleveland in the summer of 1938 saw 8000 
picketers turn out; and a series of walkouts at Bethlehem Steel in 
Lackawanna, New York, and Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, in early 1941, 
involved several thousand workers who cordoned those plants and 
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battled police and employees loyal to the company.197 It was in the 
spring of 1941, too, that UAW organizers succeeded in cordoning Ford 
Motor’s massive River Rouge plant in Dearborn, Michigan (then the 
largest factory in the world) with several thousand strikers, and forcing 
that company, which had stubbornly and violently adhered to the open 
shop for several years longer than most other big mass production 
employers, to finally agree to union representation.198 
Alongside these really big episodes of mass picketing were 
hundreds, probably thousands, of smaller occurrences. Indeed, mass 
picketing was a hallmark of Depression-era labor conflict, when the 
practice extended throughout the country and stretched across a broad 
range of industries, from oil refining and ship-building, to retail and 
newspapers, to industrialized agriculture, to government services. And 
unlike the sit-down strikes, which became far less frequent after the 
Fansteel decision, mass picketing remained common in the 1940s, 
when it played a key role in the tremendous upsurge in strikes that 
attended the end of the Second World War.199 During this period there 
were notable episodes in electrical equipment manufacturing, motion 
pictures production, aircraft and farm equipment manufacturing, public 
transit, and retail. In fact, every industry that featured a significant 
degree of labor conflict in the late 1930s and early 1940s—and most 
did—was the scene of considerable mass picketing along with a fair 
number of secondary boycotts and more than a few episodes of picket-
line violence.200 One would be hard pressed to find any important labor 
disputes in the 1930s and 1940s, besides some of the sit-down strikes, 
in which mass picketing did not feature prominently. 
Like the sit-down strikes, mass picketing was also reviled by 
business interests and elites and regularly interdicted by local and state 
authorities, who repeatedly used injunctions and arrests to break up the 
protests. As with the sit-down strikes, they were able to intervene in 
this way because the NLRB never really claimed to have preempted 
their authority to do so. In some instances, picketers were read the riot 
act before being routed by police.201 Serious violence was relatively 
uncommon, particularly come the 1940s. But it was not unheard of. 
One of the deadliest events in American labor history, the 1937 
“Memorial Day Massacre,” which occurred in the first days of the 
Little Steel Strike, resulted from an attempt by the Chicago police to 
enforce their ban on mass picketing at a struck plant owned by Republic 
Steel Corporation. Ten unionists were killed and about 100 injured 
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when, without any real provocation, the police opened fire on a crowd 
of strikers and sympathizers.202 There would be no mass picketing at 
that plant. Moreover, the strike itself, which extended across seven 
states and involved over 70,000 workers was defeated in large part 
because within weeks of the Memorial Day Massacre, authorities had 
succeeded in proscribing mass picketing nearly everywhere.203 After 
some initial success, the strikers were ultimately unable to use the tactic 
to close or keep closed the plants operated by Republic and the three 
other struck companies. Continued repression by heavily armed 
company police, judicial injunctions, and the intervention of public 
authorities saw to this. And so they lost, although not before six more 
unionists were killed. The result was a crucial turning point in labor 
history, as it marked the last time that the labor movement relied on a 
militant, industry-wide strike as an organizing tool.204 
On the question of the legality of mass picketing, too, the NLRB 
prevaricated. With its punitive and injunctive authority limited at the 
time to sanctioning employers and not unions or their agents, the 
agency did occasionally decline to protect mass picketers from reprisals 
by employers, although usually because they not only picketed in large 
numbers but engaged in overt violence. In a few notable cases, the 
NLRB rejected the view that merely having participated in mass 
picketing or other unruly protests necessarily disqualified workers from 
the benefits of the labor law.205 An oft-cited example of this sentiment 
can be found, for instance, in the Third Circuit’s published opinion in 
its review of the main NLRB case against Republic Steel, in which the 
court rejected the company’s view that thousands of strikers fired at the 
end of the Little Steel strike were disentitled to reinstatement because of 
their alleged involvement in strike violence related to mass picketing 
and other instances of picket-line militancy.206 
We think it must be conceded, however, that some disorder is 
unfortunately quite usual in an extensive or long drawn out 
strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic 
weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are 
stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot 
words lead to blows on the picket line. The transformation 
from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the 
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contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the 
fight. Violence of this nature, however much it is to be 
regretted, must have been in the contemplation of the 
Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of the [Wagner] Act, 29 
U.S.C.A. § 163, that nothing therein should be construed so 
as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right 
to strike. If this were not so the rights afforded to employees 
by the Act would be indeed illusory.207 
This remarkable expression of judicial realism represents a high-
water mark of judicial tolerance of disorder and violence in the context 
of the right to strike—on par with Governor Frank Murphy’s equally 
remarkable refusal to use the National Guard to oust the General 
Motors sit-down strikers in the winter of 1937, which was so vital to 
the union’s victory in that strike.208 
But in saying this, of course, the Third Circuit was not saying that 
violent protests were, perforce, legitimate. Instead, it was merely 
agreeing with the NLRB, which, as in Fansteel, was keen to justify 
reinstating these strikers without justifying the kind of strike they 
engaged in.209 In fact, in those mass picketing cases where it did order 
strikers reinstated, the NLRB not only balanced the disorder and 
violence of their protest against the employer’s culpability in causing 
the strike. Consistent with this view, it also condemned the strikes 
themselves as unfortunate episodes that would not arise under a well-
functioning system of labor rights—albeit, it should be noted, without 
giving much thought to how the labor law would function if it turned 
out that workers needed to resort to mass picketing to strike effectively. 
As with sit-down strikes, too, even when the NLRB ordered strikers 
reinstated, it was content to let the police and criminal courts assert 
their authority as well.210 
These moves left the NLRB a long way from justifying or 
legitimating mass picketing, particularly where it was violent or 
disorderly. But they did not please the courts, which soon rejected the 
implication of Thornhill, that strike-related protests were broadly 
protected by the First Amendment, in favor a much more restrictive 
view that not only accepted the authority of police and prosecutors to 
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restrain disorderly or coercive strikes, but resurrected the courts’ own 
authority to enjoin strikes that were transgressive in these ways.211 
A similar dynamic unfolded in regard to secondary boycotts. A 
technical term for labor protests, especially strikes, that implicate so-
called neutral parties in a labor dispute, secondary boycotts had been a 
common basis or pretext of labor injunctions in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.212 But while they continued to occur with fair 
frequency in the 1930s and 1940s, they were not as common as mass 
picketing nor as sensational as sit-down strikes. The tactic was 
important, though. A practical way to concentrate workers’ influence, 
secondary boycotts were reviled by employers as an expression of 
solidarity that threatened to evolve into the apocalyptic sum of 
employers’ fears, the general strike. And so they needed to be 
restrained. 
Like sit-down strikes and mass picketing, too, secondary boycotts 
were not directly regulated by the Wagner Act. Rather, the policing of 
them was left to others besides the NLRB, particularly judges, both 
state and federal. Between 1935 and 1947, the tactic was only 
mentioned four times in published NLRB cases; but over that same 
period, it was the subject of well over 100 reported judicial opinions, 
most of them concerning injunctions. Here, though, earlier changes in 
the law had somewhat confused matters. For in trying to rein in the 
tactic, courts and employers navigated a landscape that had been left 
rather more muddled by the Norris-LaGuardia Act and dozens of state 
laws on injunctions, than had the terrain surrounding overtly disorderly 
or trespassory kinds of labor protest.213 But suffice it to say that neither 
these laws nor the Wagner Act prohibited courts from intervening. 
In the decade after the Wagner Act was passed, the courts 
repeatedly expressed their hostility to all these abuses of the right to 
strike. They invoked the same reasoning as many pre-New Deal courts, 
framing their opposition as a stance against violence, whether it was 
manifest or not. For instance, in 1947 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in 
the course of upholding contempt proceedings against militant strikers 
in an ongoing conflict at equipment manufacturer Allis-Chalmers, 
inveighed that 
[t]he right to strike is a valuable right which not only the 
Congress and Legislatures of the various states but the courts, 
Federal and State, have sought to guard and protect, but the 
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right to strike does not include the right to commit assaults, 
destroy property, deprive other people of the right to earn 
their living in the place where they are employed.214 
The year before, the Indiana Supreme Court employed very similar 
rhetoric in a case involving criminal charges against a striker charged 
with pushing around a worker who attempted to get through a picket 
line.215 Citing other precedent, the court declared simply that 
the right to strike and the right to picket do not include the 
right to block entrances and by force, or threats of force, 
deny other persons the right to go in or upon their own 
property or to enter the premises to which they have been 
invited, expressly or by implication.216 
As was the case with the sit-down strikes, the courts’ position in such 
cases reduced to the idea that injunctions, criminal charges, and the 
like, which limited mass picketing or other affronts to property or 
disorder, were not in the least bit inconsistent with the right to strike—
they were complements of it, in its legitimate incarnations, at least.217 
Nor was it only courts that took this position. Dozens of states in 
this period legislated their own limits on labor rights, including, in this 
period before federal preemption doctrine was much settled, rights 
otherwise covered by the Wagner Act.218 And mostly they sought in this 
way to limit labor rights, enacting laws that constrained the right 
picket, to engage in secondary boycotts, or to strike. And as with the 
courts, the legislatures consistently justified these moves as mandates of 
public safety and social order.219 
In the year following Jones & Laughlin, Congress had considered 
scores of bills intended to limit labor rights, including the right to 
strike.220 The central theme in these efforts was the supposed need to 
restrict labor militancy, including the now-rare and clearly unlawful sit-
down strikes, as well as mass picketing and secondary boycotts.221 The 
 
 214.  Wis. Emp’t Relations Bd. v. Allis-Chalmers Workers' Union, Local 248, 
30 N.W.2d 183, 186–87 (Wis. 1947). 
 215.  Blue v. State, 67 N.E.2d 37 (Ind. 1946). 
 216.  Id. at 379. 
 217.  See, e.g., Carnegie-Ill. Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 45 
A.2d 857, 864 (Penn. 1946). 
 218.  H.A. Millis & H.A. Katz, A Decade of State Labor Legislation: 1937-
1947, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 282, 282 (1948). 
 219.  Id. at 295–304; HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE 
WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR 
RELATIONS 332–33, 337–38 (1950). 
 220.  White, supra note 130, at 88–90. 
 221.  Id. 
2018:1065 Its Own Dubious Battle 1109 
hearings concerning these efforts featured lurid testimony about these 
tactics and their violence as well as their impositions on property 
rights.222 None of these bills were enacted though, at least not at first. 
Although the New Deal was dead as a political movement, Congress 
was still largely controlled by Democrats and labor-friendly liberals like 
Robert Wagner still wielded considerable influence. Moreover, the war 
was producing for big capitalists enormous windfall profits that were 
underwritten by the government, making them reluctant to press too 
hard for reforms. And of course the war was an important distraction in 
its own right, one whose urgency counseled against generating the kind 
of rancor that serious revision of the Wagner Act would produce. 
Nevertheless, a change was at hand. The few bills that sought to better 
protect labor rights, like the Oppressive Labor Practices Act, first 
proposed in 1939, also got nowhere. And meanwhile, all this anti-labor 
legislation and the hearings conducted in support of it established a 
record on which further efforts could be based while also subjecting the 
NLRB to effective pressure to limit its tolerance of union militancy.223 
By 1947, these pressures had resulted it the removal of most 
leftists from the NLRB and the agency’s retreat from many of its more 
labor-friendly decisions concerning the right to strike.224 By this time, 
too, the war was over and the Congress was dominated by business-
friendly Republicans and Democrats. That summer, Congress easily 
enacted one of the most important statutes of the twentieth century, the 
Taft-Hartley Act, which significantly amended and augmented the 
Wagner Act.225 Among sections of the “Slave Labor Act,” as unionists 
called it,226 were several that restricted mass picketing and other forms 
of strike militancy. Section 8(b)(1)(A), one of a host of provisions 
establishing, for the first time, unfair labor practices that could be 
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charged against a union or its agents,227 made mass picketing subject to 
injunction by the Board. This provision was also enacted with the 
understanding that it be construed to establish the outer boundaries of 
“protected” conduct on the part of strikers, regardless of whether their 
conduct was, or even could be, prosecuted as an unfair labor practice. 
This provision was embedded in a broader condemnation of 
“misconduct” which encompassed strike violence and coercion of all 
kinds. The changes in the law directed at mass picketing prohibited any 
kind of conduct in the course of picketing or striking that was 
substantially coercive. No overt violence or threat of violence is 
necessary. The anticipation or apprehension of such is more than 
enough.228 Notably, all this was done with specific reference to cases 
like those arising from the Little Steel Strike (as well as, by extension, 
the sit-down strikes) in which the agency had not, in the Congress’ 
view, been sufficiently protective of public order and private 
property.229 
This change in the law works in hand with another, in particular 
Taft-Hartley’s amendments to § 7 of the Wagner Act, its normative 
center, to qualify the basic labor rights that the Wagner Act had 
accorded workers (the right to form unions, to provoke collective 
bargaining, and to protest as by striking) so as to include a right of 
workers to refrain from such activities and to dissent from their fellow 
workers’ expressions of solidarity. It is this right that the prohibition of 
strike-related misconduct usually directly protects, and from which the 
labor law’s protection of employers from strike militancy derives. 
Besides prohibiting strikes on the basis of misconduct or other 
judgments about how they are conducted, the Taft-Hartley Act also 
affirmed the labor law’s antipathy to some strikes on the basis of the 
overall circumstances under which they are undertaken. A good 
example of this can be found in the law’s prohibition of secondary 
boycotts, a tactic that, despite not being inherently violent in any way, 
nor dependent on any express intrusion on property rights, had long 
been condemned for being both. Section 8(b)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act 
imposed a broad ban on secondary boycotts, thus effectively prohibiting 
sympathy strikes and general strikes.230 Such strikes were made 
enjoinable, subject to damage lawsuits, and made the bases for the 
discharge of workers who participated in them. Nor did Taft-Hartley’s 
assault on the right to strike stop there. Section 8(d) limited the 
circumstances under which strikes could be launched during the term of 
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a collective bargaining agreement.231 Sections 206 through 210 
established procedures by which a strike affecting national security 
could be suspended and subjected to compulsory investigation, 
mediation, and settlement.232 
In fact, it is both lucky for the labor movement and revealing of 
what Taft-Hartley actually represented that the statute did not go even 
further on these fronts. The bill that passed the House specifically 
barred a long list of unlawful forms of “concerted activity,” including 
the use of force to impede passage on picket lines as well as sit-down 
strikes, sympathy strikes, and other “concerted interference with an 
employer’s operations.”233 Violation of these proscriptions would have 
subjected those responsible to civil lawsuit and “deprivation of rights” 
under the labor laws, including the right to reinstatement. Economic 
strikes, which is to say all strikes not motivated by employers’ 
violations of the labor law, would have been barred, too, unless the 
workers involved voted to approve the strike and the strike adhered to 
notice and “cooling off” requirements. Evidently, the preferences of 
moderate Congressmen, their fear of provoking a Presidential veto 
(which occurred anyway), and their unwillingness to offend more 
moderate unionists who otherwise accepted some of the reforms 
prevented these provisions being adopted in conference.234 In this light, 
they might have been seen as further proof of the fundamentally 
unexceptional politics of the statute that was finally enacted. 
B. The Law and the Outlawing of Strike Militancy 
This program of antiunion reform was dramatic and its inroads on 
the right to strike stark. But it was not the revolution that many have 
assumed it to be. As Chris Tomlins has pointed out, and as Harry 
Millis and Emily Clark Brown did before him, Taft-Hartley in many 
ways codified and federalized limitations on labor rights, including the 
right to strike, that had been set in place over the decade preceding its 
enactment.235 Witnesses against the act emphasized this; they 
consistently premised their opposition to the legislation on the fact that 
sit-down strikes were already unlawful, that mass picketing was already 
being reined in by police enforcing state and local laws of general 
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application, and that the states had gone a long way toward directly 
barring the practice with their own collective bargaining laws—“Baby 
Wagner Acts”; with laws that specifically criminalized mass picketing; 
and with state court injunctions.236 Not unlike the NLRB in the sit-down 
strike and mass picketing cases, and not unlike the judges who 
sympathized with it in those cases, these opponents of Taft-Hartley also 
knew that there was no hope of successfully defending the fundamental 
legitimacy of these tactics; and so, instead, they hoped to convince the 
Congress that further legislation was simply unnecessary. This of 
course did not work. 
Nor were opponents of the statute successful in preventing the 
Congress from codifying the rule that employers could fire workers 
who struck in violation of the terms of their collective bargaining 
agreement.237 Earlier in the 1940s, the NLRB had expanded on the 
principle that illegal strikes motivated by an unlawful objective, like 
that of challenging the agency’s authority to “certify” another union, 
were unprotected. This principle, too, was affirmed by the new law.238 
This, too, tends to confirm the degree to which the new statute 
conformed to already-dominant norms about labor rights. 
In the wake of Taft-Hartley, other limits on the right to strike 
emerged. In the 1950 case Elk Lumber,239 the NLRB ruled than an 
employer could discharge strikers who engaged in a slowdown, even 
though such strikes were not illegal under the Taft-Hartley Act.240 In 
other cases, the NLRB and the courts also determined that strikers who 
engaged in so-called hit-and-run tactics were unprotected, even if they 
had minimal knowledge of the nature of those tactics.241 And then later 
that decade, the Taft-Hartley amendments were augmented by several 
provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 
(Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959.242 In addition to imposing myriad 
administrative burdens on unions and toughening Taft-Hartley’s 
prohibition on secondary boycotts, Landrum-Griffin added § 8(b)(7), 
which barred most picketing for the purpose of organizing or pressing 
an employer to recognize a union.243 
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It was around the time of Landrum-Griffin that still another 
important limitation on the right to strike began to take shape—the 
doctrine eventually centered on the Boys Market decision.244 Premised 
on the pluralistic ideas that labor unions were essentially equal in 
bargaining power to employers and could therefore meaningfully 
bargain away the § 7 and § 13 rights of their members, and imbued 
with the idea that that strikes were fundamentally undesirable 
alternatives to more peaceful means of resolving labor conflict, the new 
doctrine established that strikes were also illegal if they occurred over 
issues submitted by collective bargaining agreements to arbitration, 
even in the absence of any particular provision in the contract 
prohibiting such strikes.245 Strikes of this sort could therefore be 
enjoined and those who engaged in them could be fired by their 
employers without recourse. As critics have pointed out, this doctrine 
was nowhere mandated by the terms of the Wagner Act or even Taft-
Hartley or Landrum-Griffin and seemed to violate the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. It was invented by the courts—and particularly by 
liberal justices of the Warren Court, including, quite revealingly, 
Justices William Brennan and William O. Douglas.246 
What emerged from all of this was a right to strike that was 
remarkable for how little it permitted beyond the prerogative to quit 
work and publicize grievances. To quote labor scholar Jack Getman and 
former Labor Secretary Ray Marshall, together these reforms had the 
effect of making “strikes and picketing unlawful or unprotected in 
virtually all situations other than a strike by a recognized union to 
achieve a new collective bargaining agreement or a strike to protest an 
employer’s unfair labor practice. Even in these situations, strikers can 
[often] be permanently replaced.”247 What Getman and Marshall might 
also have noted is the ironic degree to which these limits on the right to 
strike, drastic though they were, remained firmly within a framework 
of government-sponsorship of the right to strike inaugurated by § 7(a) 
and the Wagner Act in the first place. What the government gave, it 
could take away; what it protected, it could leave unprotected. 
Of course, to say this begs the question, why had these tactics ever 
been tolerated in the first place? And why did the law need to change to 
rein them in? The answer, which our account already anticipates, 
consists of several factors. One of these was the specific politics of the 
New Deal itself, of a sort already anticipated in this story. When the 
NLRB decided key cases like Fansteel, Jones & Laughlin, and Republic 
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Steel,248 important positions at the agency, including two of three board 
members, were held by Communist sympathizers, Socialists, and other 
pro-labor leftists who had managed to take up these posts in an agency 
that few thought would survive long anyway. Their presence comported 
with the most progressive feature of the Roosevelt Administration, 
which was its willingness to accommodate a measure of political 
pluralism, decentralization, and experimentation across various 
branches of government. Within a few years, the NLRB’s leftists would 
all be purged and the agency would never again be so influenced by the 
likes of them.249 In hindsight, this was inevitable, as in its last years the 
New Deal itself coalesced around a more business-friendly political 
economy while steadily giving ground, after 1937, to conservatives and 
antiradicals in Congress.250 But in the meantime, these men and women 
played a key role in ensuring a temporary lenience towards strike-
winning tactics. 
For many elites of the time, including Roosevelt himself, Frank 
Murphy, and quite a number of judges, there was value, especially 
prior to Jones & Laughlin, in allowing militant strikes to play out for a 
time, even if they did not fundamentally support the tactics they 
involved. This was, in a different sense, the mechanism by which the 
strike militancy influenced the decision in Jones & Laughlin in the first 
place. In a similar vein, there was also the sui generis nature of the 
New Deal itself, as well as the war years. This extended period was in 
every sense an emergency situation in which the traditional rules of 
governance and political economy were more easily suspended. The 
depth of economic crisis, the unprecedented (but temporary) weakening 
of capital as a consequence, the threat of communism and the sense that 
this threat would flourish in the absence of effective reform, the 
predominance of a Fordist system of production amenable to externally 
imposed organizational norms, and the mandates of wartime 
production—these were but the most prominent of a large number of 
factors that diminished and delayed effective capitalist resistance to 
deviant and erstwhile unlawful forms of labor militancy.251 Not that the 
strikes and the upsurge in labor activism were less than remarkable 
feats of worker-authored activism. But they occurred amid 
circumstances unique enough to beg another important question: Could 
they possibly have a home in this country absent such conditions? 
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III. PROPERTY, ORDER, AND THE LIMITS OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN 
LIBERAL SOCIETY 
A decade ago Jim Pope made the observation, which he 
highlighted with a frank passage from an opinion by Supreme Court 
Justice William Rehnquist, that an archaic, common law-notion of the 
property rights of employers has consistently been invoked to trump the 
rights once accorded workers by the labor law.252 Pope’s broader point 
was that courts have imposed constitutional norms of this sort on the 
labor law, and done so in an underhanded, intellectually dishonest way 
that, among other things, deprived workers of the right to act in “self-
defense,” as by invalidating sit-down strikes and endorsing the use of 
permanent replacement workers.253 
Pope’s perspective is typical of those who argue for the restoration 
of an effective right to strike. In particular, his critique is in rough 
alignment with two other important studies of the Wagner Act by James 
Atleson and Karl Klare. In his 1983 book Values and Assumptions in 
American Labor Law, Atleson argues that the Wagner Act was 
systematically perverted by the unwarranted insertion of values not 
inherent in “the language of the statute or its legislative history.”254 
Klare’s contention, featured in a 1978 article, is that the Act, which 
“was susceptible of an overtly anticapitalist interpretation,” was recast 
by the Supreme Court as it “embraced those aims of the Act most 
consistent with the assumptions of liberal capitalism and foreclosed 
those potential paths of development most threating to the established 
order.”255 
Like Pope, both Atleson and Klare develop their claims with 
specific reference to the right to strike, including once again sit-down 
strikes and the replacement worker doctrine, as well as, in Atleson’s 
case, slowdowns.256 Getman makes very similar claims, asserting that 
the right to strike was the victim of judicial overreach and 
manipulation.257 Needless to say, what these scholars have in mind 
when they demand the restoration of an effective right to strike is not 
merely the right of workers to quit work, which the law broadly 
supports, but which is of so little value to most workers. One of the 
great virtues of their work, in fact, is its success in refuting the idea 
that such an emasculated right to strike could ever mean much in a 
context where workers are relatively easily replaced and, compared to 
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employers, have little in the way of financial reserves; and where 
unions incur great difficulty maintaining solidarity among hard-pressed 
workers who feel, quite reasonably, that by striking they are putting the 
jobs and financial fortunes at risk with little hope of getting much in 
return. Instead, these scholars have in mind right a right to strike that 
entails the ability to put real pressure on employers without the workers 
unduly sacrificing their jobs or needlessly compromising their material 
well-being. They envisage a right to strike that is at once practical, 
functional, and legally legitimate, and not merely an artifact of rhetoric 
or the kind of thing that workers might occasionally pull off, but only 
in defiance of the law. 
Early on, this scholarship was attacked rather viciously from the 
right by people who argued that it went too far and transgressed moral 
boundaries. Klare in particular was the victim of charges that he was, 
in essence, defending criminals, perhaps even the moral equivalent of 
“rapists.”258 Besides its intemperate character, such criticism is entirely 
captive to its own morally questionable assumptions that, when push 
comes to shove, capital and property must prevail over labor. In fact, 
the problem with the right to strike scholarship is not that it goes too far 
but rather that it does not go far enough in following through on the 
implications of its critique. For embedded in its proponents’ work, 
summarized so well in Klare’s judgment that the right to strike was 
sacrificed to the “assumptions of liberal capitalism,” is something far 
more essential than a series of dubious judicial or legislative sleights of 
hand, or lost opportunities. Rather, it seems, the fate of the right to 
strike was the product of an official adherence to mandates of the 
current legal and political order that were, from the perspective of just 
about every judge or legislator in the country, simply inviolate. In 
depriving workers of the right to engage in sit-down strikes or mass 
picketing, denying them the prerogative to engage in secondary 
boycotts, pushing them into litigation and arbitration in lieu of strikes, 
and subjecting them to permanent replacement if they go out on strike, 
courts and legislatures have not so much betrayed a radical potential in 
the labor law as kept the law anchored to liberal values that are simply 
anathema to an effective right to strike, and in a way that is 
incompatible with a robust and functional system of labor rights. 
Of course workers have not been passive objects in this process. 
Their activism has shaped, or threatened to shape, the law in this realm 
even as it has been shaped by the law. From this vantage, which draws 
on the pioneering insights of social historians of labor like E.P. 
Thompson, they have quite correctly depicted the right to strike as a 
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fluid and contested thing whose meaning and boundaries workers have 
also claimed, defended, and sought to legitimate in the face of rival 
efforts of the business community and their allies. Klare and Pope have 
persuasively described the struggle surrounding the sit-down strikes in 
these terms. And this writer has made similar arguments about mass 
picketing and other types of strike militancy.259 But to acknowledge that 
workers struggled in these ways to claim and defend a robust and 
effective right to strike is not to say that they succeeded, or more to the 
point, that they ever had a real chance of succeeding. 
This reading of how the law evolved is entirely consistent with 
how the sit-down strikes in particular were treated outside of the courts, 
the NLRB, and the Congress. Following in the path of CIO leaders 
themselves, who viewed the strikes as useful expedients that 
nonetheless presented a risk to their own authority to control the timing 
and politics of labor protest, some legal scholars and commentators 
supported the strikes but did so reluctantly and contingently.260 
Ironically, in so doing they offered powerful proof of just how deviant 
the strikes were. The strikes, they said, were a necessary and excusable 
response to extraordinary circumstances in which open shop employers 
not only flouted the Wagner Act but fended off unions with 
extraordinary, sometimes terroristic means of repression.261 It was in 
this frame that legal scholar Henry Hart joined with coauthor Edward 
Prichard, a young protégé of Felix Frankfurter, in penning a 
compelling defense of the Board’s handling of the Fansteel case.262 
Lloyd Garrison, dean of Wisconsin Law School, former New Deal 
official, and a principle in a failed attempt to mediate the Little Steel 
Strike, advanced a similar argument, supporting the strikes but 
conceding that the courts would never honor the practice as a right.263 
Others did go somewhat further in justifying the sit-down strikes. 
Leon Green, dean of Northwestern Law School, depicted the strikes as 
legitimate means of negotiating a relationship between workers and 
employers that no longer contemplated the former being fired en 
masse—any more than a wife could “fire her husband, a parent his 
child.”264 “It is thus,” he concluded, “that employees may peacefully sit 
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and wait until their complaints are ironed out through negotiations.”265 
James Landis, who chaired the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and was dean-elect of Harvard Law School at the time, argued 
passionately in two different speeches delivered at the height of the 
wave of sit-down strikes that, even if unlawful under existing laws, the 
strikes might well represent the making of a new right.266 Just as the 
right to picket or the right to strike in a conventional way had to be 
forged in this manner, so might the right to a sit-down strike be 
unfolding.267 
Landis’ argument is intriguing, compelling even, but only by its 
own terms, which is to say the terms of one willing to compromise on 
his faith in prevailing notions of property and order. Most legal 
scholars were not. Even if they defended the strikes they did so in the 
fashion of Hart, Prichard, and Green. Like the NLRB and Justice Reed, 
and probably like most scholars today, these more typical defenders of 
sit-down strikes made no pretense of endorsing their broad use—as for 
instance to redress minor violations of the labor law by employers, let 
alone to aid workers in winning run-of-the-mill contract disputes of the 
sort they so often lose in the face of the intrinsic weakness of 
conventional strikes and the massive disparity in economic power 
between the parties to these disputes. Instead, they validated the strikes 
as extreme but semi-legitimate responses to extraordinary provocations. 
And even this was far too much for most. Sentiments at the time among 
legal scholars mostly ran against the strikes and the Board’s handling of 
them.268 Outside of CIO and left-wing circles, Landis and Green were 
widely condemned for defending the strikes. Dean Dinwoodey, law 
professor and editor of U.S. Law Week, spoke for most legal scholars 
when he declared in the New York Times that “under well settled 
principles of property law, the employer has a legally protected right to 
the exclusive possession of his factory or plant, just as the householder 
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has to the exclusive possession of his home.”269 In this sense, 
Dinwoodey said, the strikers were really nothing but trespassers.270 
Newspapers were the dominant media of the time. And most were 
ardently opposed to the sit-down strikes as well. They expressed this 
position in hundreds, perhaps even thousands of editorial and 
editorialized news stories about the strikes. Among dozens of examples 
from the Washington Post were declarations that the tactic was a 
“social menace,” “a close parallel to the methods by which the Russian 
Soviets took over industry,” and an “act of war”; and the newspaper 
celebrated the apparent increase in opposition to the practice.271 The 
New York Herald Tribune deemed the strikes “a violation of human 
rights,” by which the paper’s editors meant not only property rights and 
the right of public to uninterrupted production of good but also, in line 
the then-expanding politics of the “right to work,” “the right of a man 
to do his job.”272 The very moderate Christian Science Monitor also 
condemned the strikes, concluding that they were bound to “place 
public compensation and seizure above the law.”273 Perhaps most 
revealingly, the New York Herald Tribune declared the strikes “a 
euphemism for dictation.”274 Although a few liberal papers like the St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch were very judicious in their coverage of the sit-
down strikes, and the strikes were endorsed by leftist papers like the 
Daily Worker and various CIO publications, no major mainstream 
paper ever came close to saying the strikes were legitimate.275 Always 
an abiding faith in property and order stood in the way. 
Polling was in its infancy at the time, but what there was suggests 
that a majority of the public also opposed the tactic. A survey by 
Fortune magazine completed in the summer of 1937 showed that very 
few members of the public (and of business community) thought it 
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worth bloodshed to repress the sit-down strikes.276 However, the 
majority disapproved of them. In fact, even a majority of workers 
appeared to reject the tactic and wanted it banned by law.277 A similar 
survey by Gallup taken around the same time showed that two-thirds of 
respondents favored outlawing the strikes.278 
Well before the wave of sit-down strikes began to abate later in 
1937, the business community and its allies in Congress were pushing 
legislation to bar them. Although it did produce a resolution 
condemning the practice, the effort to ban the strikes failed, probably 
because its impetus was dissipated by a recognition on the part of 
liberals who fundamentally opposed the tactic that employers were 
culpable in provoking the strikes, and that the fate of the Wagner Act 
and the New Deal was uncertain and might depend on the strikes 
succeeding.279 As the sit-downs faded in frequency later in the year, the 
concern with them was also displaced by a broader campaign against 
strike militancy, one focused more and more on mass picketing. 
Nevertheless, some states did explicitly outlaw sit-down strikes—a few 
in 1937, others in the years that followed.280 
Like every other aspect of Taft-Hartley, the 1947 amendments to 
the Wagner Act that directly touched on mass picketing and other forms 
of strike militancy were strongly supported by the business community, 
including prominent employers and business associations like the 
National Association of Manufactures, the American Iron and Steel 
Institute, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.281 Promoted by these 
groups, witness after witness regaled the Congress with stories of how 
mass picketing, along with secondary boycotts and other militant 
tactics, gave unions too much power, eroded the power of owners and 
their supervisors, and threatened the American way.282 Time and again, 
senators and representatives expressed their support for new restrictions 
on the right to strike as mandates of a common faith, a commitment of 
the nation itself, to the principles of property and order. “They are a 
veritable pronouncement of contempt of law and order, private 
capitalism, and ownership of property, competition, and everything that 
even smacks of liberty,” said Ohio Representative Frederick Smith, 
speaking of NLRB positions that seemed to continence an expansive 
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view of the right to strike.283 “He has been required to employ or 
reinstate individuals who have assaulted him and his employees and 
want only to destroy his property,” said New York Representative 
Ralph Gwinn, in defense of employers supposedly ravaged by such 
strikes.284 Under prevailing law, such employers endured “respectable 
robbery without liability,” Gwinn said.285  
We in America prize human individual liberty even above the 
state. We believe that property rights are natural to man. The 
best protection of those property rights and of that liberty is in 
the balancing of the rights of our workers and the rights of 
our businessmen so that the great majority of our citizens will 
enjoy that private property and that human liberty,  
said Representative Charles Kersten of Wisconsin, condemning mass 
picketing of the sort that had recently featured at the Allis-Chalmers 
plants in his state.286 Consider, too, the remarks of Representative John 
Robsion of Kentucky:  
There have been cases in this country where literally 
thousands of persons have picketed a plant and engaged in 
violence. In my honest opinion, labor nor management never 
did help its cause by engaging in lawlessness, violence, and 
the destruction of the property of others, and under this bill 
and the law the company cannot mistreat, browbeat and 
engage in violence and lawlessness against the workers.287 
Nor was it only conservatives who joined in this, as evidenced by 
remarks of Utah Senator Elbert Thomas, who had supported the New 
Deal and the work of the La Follette Committee, on which he had 
served, and who had joined with Robert La Follette Jr. in 1939 in 
sponsoring a pro-labor amendment to the Wagner Act. For a worker, 
he said,  
to interpret his right to strike as being an absolute right, 
entitling him to quit work while the water is turned on in the 
plant, for instance, thus destroying his employer’s property, 
or for him to interpret the right to strike as permitting him to 
quit work while leaving in a mine certain equipment in such a 
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way as to result in costly destruction, would obviously be 
most improper. No person has a right to do such things. No 
one has a right to act against society. No one has a right to 
destroy it.288 
And so it went, the references to the inviolate values of property 
and order in defense of the legislation much too numerous to 
exhaustively cite. It is easy to dismiss these contentions, even from 
moderates like Thomas, as the contrived utterances of people who were 
singularly committed to advancing their narrow class and political 
interests. To some extent, they surely were that. But these views were 
hardly outside the mainstream of American politics, particularly among 
elites, broad swathes of the middle class, and important elements of the 
working class. Indeed, they comported very conveniently with 
commonplace views about the virtues of property and order and 
resonated with what much of the public believed at the time—this is 
what made them so resonant. And whether contrived or not, they 
performed an important function. By invoking the virtues of property 
and order in this way, these Congressmen and the witnesses before 
them who favored restricting mass picketing and other forms of 
coercive protest were conspicuously able to couch this position as 
something other than a malicious attack on the “legitimate” rights of 
labor. Instead, theirs was a mission to realign the labor law with 
fundamental American values, to save it from those who had allowed 
labor policies and the habits of union to stray beyond this field. In this 
way they were able to deflect, if not disprove, the all-too-apt contention 
by the legislation’s opponents, repeated many times in the process, that 
what Taft-Hartley was really about was elevating property rights over 
human rights. 
Added proof that strike militancy was actually indefensible can be 
found in the fact that no scholars would justify it, not even mass 
picketing—at least not beyond the point at which it became coercive, 
which was of course the very point at which it was employed in an 
effective way. In the wake of the Memorial Day Massacre, most all the 
major papers sided with the police, declaring the strikers enemies of 
public order who brought the violence upon themselves. Initially, this 
stance was premised on distorted readings of the events of that day that 
charged the strikers with various acts of provocation. But even when 
the La Follette Committee publicized a Paramount Pictures newsreel 
(which the company had suppressed) and unearthed other evidence that 
proved that most all of the blame for what happened that day rested on 
 
 288.  Id. at 4416, reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LABOR 
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1158 (1948). 
2018:1065 Its Own Dubious Battle 1123 
the police, most of the papers still adhered to this reading of the 
events.289 
This attitude toward mass picketing was a centerpiece of revived 
interest in the right to strike in the major papers, one that extended 
from the mid 1930s into the 1940s and exceeded the surge in interest of 
the late 1910s and early 1920s. In 1941, for instance, the New York 
Herald Tribune described pending legislative attempts to limit mass 
picketing as “too thoroughly justified to require argument.”290 In 1946 
the New York Times summoned up the rhetoric used to condemn the sit-
down trikes and declared mass picketing a “seizure” that was “by its 
very nature illegal because it infringes both individual and property 
rights.”291 Conservative though he was, newspaperman David 
Lawrence, founder of U.S. News and World Report, spoke for many 
when he declared mass picketing an act of “violence” by which 
unionists were seeking to take the law into their own hands.292 In fact, 
Lawrence’s judgement that mass picketing was an affront to civil 
liberties aligned with that of the American Civil Liberties Union, long a 
champion of labor rights, which, as the New York Times was keen to 
note, also condemned the tactic in these terms. 293 
Such views fit with a broader tendency to criticize the right to 
strike as being too aggressively employed by unionists and too 
generously construed by the courts and the NLRB. In the decade 
between the validation of the Wagner and the passage of Taft-Hartley, 
newspapers gave voice to a criticism of mass picketing and other 
erstwhile excessive forms of strike behavior, one that typically 
described the Wagner Act as having gone too far in protecting workers’ 
prerogatives to protest. A typical example of the content and tenor of 
these pieces is a 1941 editorial in the Chicago Daily Tribune:  
“The right to strike” is now used frequently to mean the right 
of union leaders to force men who don’t want to strike to do 
so. It is used to justify the seizure of industries and the 
blockading of factories by mass picketing to prevent the 
entrance of workers who are satisfied with their working 
conditions and the movement of goods in and out of the 
plants. “The right to strike” in this sense means not only that 
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every strike is right but that every measure which may be 
adopted to win a strike is right.294 
In fact, at this crucial moment it was common for elites of all 
stripes to claim that they supported the right to strike and yet to assert 
that it was being abused by unionists who insisted on winning every 
labor dispute and using coercive and disorderly methods to do so. In 
1946, Hebert Hoover, who might well have denied just such a thing 
fifteen years earlier, inveighed that “Nobody denies that there is a 
‘right’ to strike”; but that right, he said, had been abused to the 
detriment of the public interest.295 Although considerably more liberal 
than Hoover, Walter Lippmann, the extremely popular political 
commentator, offered a similar judgement about a railroad strike that 
same year, concluding “we must henceforth refuse to regard the right 
to strike as universal and absolute, and as one of the inalienable rights 
of man.”296 Also writing in 1946, Henry Ford II, whose father had used 
a small army of thugs and toughs to enforce the open shop at his plants 
and bitterly fought unionization until 1941, now purported at once to 
support the right to strike—and to believe that it should be limited.297 
“There is no longer any question of the right of organized workers to 
strike, but that right,” he said, “is being misused.”298 
Like Taft-Hartley’s supporters in Congress, figures like Hoover, 
Lippmann, and Ford did not trouble themselves to confess that such 
tactics as they so blithely condemned might actually be necessary to 
counterbalance the power of employers and give life and meaning to a 
statute that did not take adequate account of this basic reality, let alone 
that they were essential in establishing the idea that workers enjoyed 
any enforceable right to strike. But they did not have to, either; for they 
honestly did not believe that labor should generally prevail. Liberal or 
conservative, it did not matter; these were capitalists in a capitalist 
society, contented, consistent with their values, with a right to strike 
that went little further than a right to withhold one’s labor. 
To be sure, these were not the views of ordinary people. But the 
public’s perspective did not seem to vary all that much from those of 
elites. Although overall approval of union membership as measured in 
 
 294.  Editorial, The Right to Strike, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 22, 1941, at 14. 
 295.  Herbert Hoover, Editorial, The Right to Strike: The Former President 
Sets Forth His View on One of the Hottest Issues Facing the Nation Today, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 29, 1946, at G7; see also Leo Walmon, Right to Strike Okay, But Public Needs 
Labor Law Protection, WASH. POST, Jul. 8, 1945, at B5. 
 296.  Walter Lippmann, Editorial, The Right to Strike, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, 
May 25, 1946, at 8. 
 297.  Bigger Output by Men, Tools Urged by Ford: Assails Misuse of Right to 
Strike, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 17, 1946, at 31. 
 298.  Id. 
2018:1065 Its Own Dubious Battle 1125 
Gallup surveys slipped noticeably after 1937, it remained quite high—
well above fifty percent right through the 1940s.299 Nevertheless, 
Gallup surveys taken in June 1937, after the big wave of sit-strikes had 
waned noticeably, but while mass picketing and overall levels of labor 
militancy remained high, revealed that fifty-seven percent supported the 
proposition that the militia should “be called out whenever strike 
trouble threatens.”300 
As with the sit-down strikes, too, the status of mass picketing and 
other forms of strike militancy can also be gauged by the way these 
tactics were defended. During the hearings on Taft-Hartley, only a few 
labor leaders stood against the torrent of criticism of these practices by 
businessmen, conservative unionists, and congressmen and senators, 
and tried to parry the move to prohibit the strikes. With only a couple 
of exceptions, most of them consistently qualified their defense of these 
tactics by downplaying their coercive qualities—again the very thing 
that made them so effective in the first place—while also describing 
them as expedients, presumably temporary, that were justified by the 
unreasonable stances of some employers.301 
While the political motivations and implications of this campaign 
against these forms of strike militancy might be as dubious as the 
attacks on the sit-down strikes, their value in expressing dominant 
political judgments concerning these tactics is not. Repeatedly, it was 
taken for granted that workers could not be allowed to excessively 
coerce their fellow workers, that they should be obliged to adhere to 
their contractual obligations, that they did not own the streets or the 
workplace, and that whatever the right to strike was, it was surely, as 
Brandeis had insisted, not an absolute right. Of course, all of this was 
controversial for many unionists. But unionists were almost the only 
ones to really push back against these measures. Even President Harry 
Truman’s dramatic veto of Taft-Hartley is widely regarded as a 
political move taken with the expectation that Congress would override 
the veto anyway.302 It is also notable that despite dedicating itself to this 
aim, the labor movement has never come close to repealing the Taft-
Hartley Act, or even securing the enactment of favorable amendments 
to any of its provisions. 
And then there is the replacement worker doctrine where, if 
anything, the change in the law even more clearly reflected the depth 
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and power of liberal norms. For the rule established in Mackay Radio 
came out of the blue. It was set forth in a case which required no such 
question to be resolved, in a manner that drew no support from the text 
of the Wagner Act, and on the basis of legislative history that was 
ambiguous at best. Worse, as Getman points out, the rule is in direct 
conflict with the very statutory principle of barring discrimination on 
the basis of a worker’s assertion of the basic labor rights laid out in § 7 
that it was, itself, supposedly derived from.303 
As an exercise in statutory construction and administration, 
Mackay Radio makes no sense; but as a defense of property rights it 
makes all the sense in the world. One way to see this is to consider 
what would have happened had the Court decided the matter in a 
fundamentally different way. If employers were barred from replacing 
economic strikers, it seems likely that strikes would have proliferated to 
an extraordinary extent, as workers could at least plausibly have 
expected to be able to strike under a broad array of circumstances and 
yet be restored to their jobs no matter the outcome. But precisely 
because such a doctrine would have given workers so much power, 
Congress would almost certainly have stepped in with its own rule, 
codifying employers’ right to permanently replace striking workers and 
bringing this to an end. Ultimately, it is difficult to imagine a much 
more liberal alternative to the Mackay Radio rule surviving for very 
long—a point that also draws support from labor’s failure to repeal the 
rule in Congress in the early 1990s.304 
A simple exercise in counterfactual speculation bears similar fruit 
in regard to other, more basic, limitations on the right to strike, 
including those imposed relative to sit-down strikes, mass picketing, 
and secondary boycotts. Shrill and self-interested though it was, all the 
testimony from employers and their allies during the hearings on Taft-
Hartley or Landrum-Griffin about the perils posed by these tactics, was 
fundamentally correct. For were workers able to make unfettered use of 
sit-down strikes, mass picketing, and general strikes and sympathy 
walkouts, they could have very much challenged the sovereignty of 
capitalists in and about the workplace, and with this the bedrock 
institutions and norms of liberal society. As Jim Pope puts it, Charles 
Evans Hughes’ opinion in Fansteel established the maxim that “the 
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employer could violate the workers’ statutory rights without sacrificing 
its property rights, while the workers could not violate the employer’s 
property rights without sacrificing their statutory rights.”305 This is 
unquestionably true. But equally unquestionable is that neither this 
court nor any other important arbiter of legal rights in this country was 
ever prepared to endorse the contrary view that property rights might 
be sufficiently subordinate to labor rights as to justify the kinds of 
tactics by which workers could routinely defeat powerful employers on 
the fields of industrial conflict. 
Significantly, there is no reason to believe that any of this has 
changed or is poised to change today. Quite the contrary: In a culture 
and political system more immersed than ever in the veneration of 
order and control, mediated by criminal law and police work, by the 
celebration of property rights, and by a readiness to punish violence, it 
is all but unthinkable that the courts or the NLRB would deign to give 
legal sanction to workers to engage in any sustained way in the kinds of 
tactics that might make going on strike a worthwhile thing to do. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the outstanding ironies in a story rich with many is that the 
very things which made the prospect of an effective right to strike seem 
for a time so viable—the unlawful, illiberal, and altogether intolerable 
coerciveness of sit-down strike and mass picketing, especially—are also 
what made this concept impossible to ever realize. As we have seen, 
effective strikes could build the labor movement, validate the Wagner 
Act, secure the New Deal, and in many ways change America. But they 
could not make themselves legitimate. 
So it is that workers have found themselves with a right to strike 
that equals little more than a right to quit work—and maybe lose their 
jobs or their houses and savings in the balance. They have a right to 
strike, as Steinbeck’s character, Mac, complained, but they “can’t 
picket”—at least, not in a way that is really apt to change anything. 
And so they do not strike—in fact, under these circumstances they 
usually should not strike. 
The proof of this is readily evident, not only in the dramatic 
decrease in strikes since the 1970s, but in the sad regularity with which 
even the most vibrant strikes have ended in defeat for workers. Phelps 
Dodge (1983), Greyhound (1983 and 1990), Hormel (1985-1986), 
Caterpillar (1992, 1993, and 1994-1995), Detroit Daily News/Daily 
Free Press (1995-1997)—these are but the most notable of a litany of 
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vibrant strikes since the 1970s that ended in failure.306 They are, in fact, 
the definitive labor struggles of this period, overshadowing a much 
smaller number of comparable disputes, like the strikes at United Parcel 
Service in 1997 and Verizon in 2016 that—often shaped by uniquely 
favorable labor dynamics—ended in something resembling victory for 
the union.307 Each of these big and unsuccessful strikes was motived by 
very modest, in fact anti-concessionary, goals and well-supported by 
workers and the larger public alike. And each featured mass picketing 
and other attempts at militancy. But these tactics were met with 
injunctions, civil suits, mass arrests, and criminal prosecutions, which 
ended the protests and left the employers free to exert their vast 
advantages in material wealth and political power, end the disputes on 
their terms, and leave thousands of strikers unemployed.308 
It is true that the last year or so has witnessed what many people 
have declared to be a miniature strike wave, that has been widely 
celebrated by unionists and their allies as a welcome departure from 
past trends and portent, many hope, of a sustained resurgence of labor 
activism.309 Headlined by statewide teachers strikes in West Virginia, 
Oklahoma, and Arizona, all in the first part of 2018, the strikes 
commanded a great deal of media coverage, at least compared to what 
labor disputes usually receive nowadays.310 However, closer inspection 
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suggests that this wave is mainly an artifact of wishful thinking 
exacerbated by the novelty for many people nowadays of seeing these 
strikes reported in the media. For in fact, the number of strikes over 
the last couple of years has remained close to the level that has 
prevailed for several decades now.311 
Perhaps more significant in putting these strikes in proper context 
is a reflection on their character. None have been organizing strikes. 
All of these strikes have been over contracts and working conditions, 
with many driven by workers’ opposition to concessions and ended with 
less than spectacular gains by the strikers.312 Moreover, the strikes 
which comprise this supposed wave have been disproportionately 
mounted by government workers—teachers, mainly—who are not 
covered by the National Labor Relations Act. For this reason, several 
of the strikes have been unlawful, as state law typically denies such 
workers the right to strike anyway. But at the same time—and this may 
be the most crucial point—none of these strikes has unfolded in an 
especially militant way, at least by historical standards. There have 
been no big sit-down strikes, no threatening episodes of mass picketing, 
no routing of “scabs,” no destruction of property. Which is all to say 
that the kinds of strikes that built the labor movement eighty or more 
years ago remain thoroughly in check. 
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There is little hope within the prevailing political and juridical 
order that things could ever be any different. Perhaps the right to strike 
could be made effective if it were fundamentally reconfigured in 
illiberal, corporatist terms. The right could conceivably be reconfigured 
such that the government might intervene more aggressively and make 
the workers protests effective—for example, stepping in to decide by 
adjudication, mediation, or arbitration which side should win a strike. 
Elements of this approach, which was vigorously opposed by IWW and 
AFL unionists alike in the early twentieth century, can be found 
internationally, in industry-specific statutes like the Railway Labor Act, 
and in labor statutes that apply to government workers, although most 
often when the law goes down this path it all but dispenses with the 
right to strike anyway, treating it as a redundancy, a tool without a 
purpose. As Senator Wagner himself perceived, alignment between the 
excessive reliance on the authority of the state to manage labor relations 
and the denigration of the right to strike was both dysfunctional and 
dangerous. As he put it back in the summer of 1937, defending the 
recently-passed statute that bore his name and the right that he placed at 
the center of it, 
[t]he outlawry of the right to strike is a natural concomitant of 
authoritarian governments. It occurs only when a government 
is willing to assume definitive responsibility for prescribing 
every element in the industrial relationship—the length of the 
day, the size of the wage, the terms and conditions of work.313 
Clearly no such regime will be instituted in any event, not least 
because, as interest in such schemes in the twentieth century makes 
clear, support for this kind of corporatist intervention in labor disputes 
has itself been an elite reaction against strike militancy that currently 
does not exist. Where does this leave workers and unions, possessed of 
a right they cannot afford to surrender but cannot rely on as a means of 
advancing their interests and standing in society? Are they bound like 
Steinbeck’s strikers to meet defeat, albeit in a more peaceful way? 
Maybe. In one of his many commentaries on the sit-down strikes as 
they raged across the country in the spring of 1937, Walter Lippmann 
took time to analyze one of the speeches in which James Landis had 
argued that the tactic might well become a new right, in the same way 
that the right to strike in general had been created through its persistent 
assertion in the face of opposition and incredulity. No revolutionary, 
Lippmann nonetheless understood what Landis apparently did not: that 
the right Landis spoke of was revolutionary in its conception, and 
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therefore not just an impracticality but a contradiction. “Never in the 
history of the law has rebellion been made lawful. Only the rights 
demanded by the rebels have been legalized,” said Lippman.314 
As the labor scholars who call for the restoration of an effective 
right to strike have all understood, the tactics that made such strikes 
possible were tolerated only so long as there was not a functional 
system of labor rights in place, one that could stand alone in courts and 
hearing rooms. Once this was the case—once the rebel unionists’ aims, 
or at least those imputed to them, were realized—the sit-down strikes 
were predictably banned, and then so were mass picketing, secondary 
boycotts, and so forth. Thus it is that in cases like Fansteel and the 
debates on Taft-Hartley, sit-down strikers, mass picketers, and the like 
were presented as enemies of the labor law. Even more recent attacks 
on the right to strike, such as complaints in the 1980s about union 
violence going uncensored and the modest moves by the NLRB to rein 
in this, too, have been inevitably justified not in terms of overthrowing 
the system of labor rights but managing it, reconciling its virtues with 
the normative and juridical mandates of liberal society. And so it is that 
the right to strike—the right to an effective strike—has been sacrificed 
not in the name of capitalist hegemony but on liberalism’s altar of labor 
peace. Unfortunately, so far as the interests of workers go, these are 
the same thing. 
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